Acartia_Bogart
Posts: 2927
Joined: Sep. 2014
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BB is really getting under KF's thin skin.
| Quote | Brother Brian
July 14, 2019 at 1:48 pm
KF@375, it is interesting that you are dissembling on my question, which has nothing to do with the morality of sexuality. It was about whether a homosexual who prefers to keep his sexual attraction to himself is obliged to tell the truth when asked about it for employment. |
And, in response:
| Quote | Kairosfocus
July 15, 2019 at 2:32 am
BB, The number of times you have tried to drag discussion threads through the sewer itself is telling. This thread has a focus which is civilisation-critical and needs to be properly addressed. After nearly 400 comments, it is clear that atheism does have a challenge of worldview warrant but many atheists (given recent movements) feel they have a rhetorical winner argument by posing on so-called weak atheism as default. All they actually show is a stubborn refusal to acknowledge that they too have worldviews that require warrant, that all worldviews have in them an inevitable commitment to first plausibles that are unprovable, either in principle or in practice [start with the first principles of reason and Agrippa’s trilemma of warrant], and that a responsible position will freely engage the comparative difficulties process. That approach is symptomatic, and can be translated into what it effectively means: I cannot actually provide cogent comparative difficulties warrant for evolutionary materialistic scientism (the relevant form of atheism) and/or its fellow travellers, but can pose on the rhetorical stance that as a key claim is a denial, I am not making a claim other than to being the default. Fair comment: self-defeatingly indefensible, in effect declaring a rationally unwarranted faith dogmatically and seeking to impose it on the pretence that it is the intelligent educated, scientifically minded man’s view. It is ironic and revealing to see such a dogmatic faith declaration on the part of those who claim to disdain faith as irrational. KF
PS: I will be getting back to focus soon enough, on the issue of theistic warrant.
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Kairosfocus
July 15, 2019 at 4:00 am
F/N: Are theistic “proofs” useless, and is there an adequate warrant for theism?
Let’s note from just above:
[BB, 381:] The burden of proof lies with those who claim something exists, not with those who claim that there is no compelling evidence that something exists.
[ET, 382:] It is up to you to explain why you think the evidence is not compelling, especially in the face of the fact you have nothing to explain it.
[SA, 383:] ET @ 382 has indicated the problem. What you said [in 381] does not follow . . . . You made a statement. The burden of proof is on you to defend the statement you made. Clearly, you can’t or don’t want to do it. But you made the point anyway.
The reality of the atheistical default claim is clear, as is how it seeks to evade responsibility to warrant any serious worldview claim. Let me note, again, from SEP as at 11 above and as was added to the OP — something that has not been cogently answered by those trying the default to atheism gambit backed up by what on fair comment is ill-advised selective hyperskepticism regarding worldviews warrant and ethical theism:
1. Definitions of “Atheism”
“Atheism” is typically defined in terms of “theism”. Theism, in turn, is best understood as a proposition—something that is either true or false. It is often defined as “the belief that God exists”, but here “belief” means “something believed”. It refers to the propositional content of belief, not to the attitude or psychological state of believing. This is why it makes sense to say that theism is true or false and to argue for or against theism. If, however, “atheism” is defined in terms of theism and theism is the proposition that God exists and not the psychological condition of believing that there is a God, then it follows that atheism is not the absence of the psychological condition of believing that God exists (more on this below). The “a-” in “atheism” must be understood as negation instead of absence, as “not” instead of “without”. Therefore, in philosophy at least, atheism should be construed as the proposition that God does not exist (or, more broadly, the proposition that there are no gods).
This definition has the added virtue of making atheism a direct answer to one of the most important metaphysical questions in philosophy of religion, namely, “Is there a God?” There are only two possible direct answers to this question: “yes”, which is theism, and “no”, which is atheism. Answers like “I don’t know”, “no one knows”, “I don’t care”, “an affirmative answer has never been established”, or “the question is meaningless” are not direct answers to this question.
While identifying atheism with the metaphysical claim that there is no God (or that there are no gods) is particularly useful for doing philosophy, it is important to recognize that the term “atheism” is polysemous—i.e., it has more than one related meaning—even within philosophy. For example, many writers at least implicitly identify atheism with a positive metaphysical theory like naturalism or even materialism. Given this sense of the word, the meaning of “atheism” is not straightforwardly derived from the meaning of “theism”. While this might seem etymologically bizarre, perhaps a case can be made for the claim that something like (metaphysical) naturalism was originally labeled “atheism” only because of the cultural dominance of non-naturalist forms of theism, not because the view being labeled was nothing more than the denial of theism. On this view, there would have been atheists even if no theists ever existed—they just wouldn’t have been called “atheists”. (Baggini [2003] suggests this line of thought, though his “official” definition is the standard metaphysical one.) Although this definition of “atheism” is a legitimate one, it is often accompanied by fallacious inferences from the (alleged) falsity or probable falsity of atheism (= naturalism) to the truth or probable truth of theism.
Departing even more radically from the norm in philosophy, a few philosophers and quite a few non-philosophers claim that “atheism” shouldn’t be defined as a proposition at all, even if theism is a proposition. Instead, “atheism” should be defined as a psychological state: the state of not believing in the existence of God (or gods). This view was famously proposed by the philosopher Antony Flew and arguably played a role in his (1972) defense of an alleged presumption of “atheism”. The editors of the Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Bullivant & Ruse 2013) also favor this definition and one of them, Stephen Bullivant (2013), defends it on grounds of scholarly utility. His argument is that this definition can best serve as an umbrella term for a wide variety of positions that have been identified with atheism. Scholars can then use adjectives like “strong” and “weak” to develop a taxonomy that differentiates various specific atheisms. Unfortunately, this argument overlooks the fact that, if atheism is defined as a psychological state, then no proposition can count as a form of atheism because a proposition is not a psychological state. This undermines his argument in defense of Flew’s definition; for it implies that what he calls “strong atheism”—the proposition (or belief in the sense of “something believed”) that there is no God—is not really a variety of atheism at all. In short, his proposed “umbrella” term leaves strong atheism out in the rain.
Although Flew’s definition of “atheism” fails as an umbrella term, it is certainly a legitimate definition in the sense that it reports how a significant number of people use the term. Again, there is more than one “correct” definition of “atheism”. The issue for philosophy is which definition is the most useful for scholarly or, more narrowly, philosophical purposes. In other contexts, of course, the issue of how to define “atheism” or “atheist” may look very different. For example, in some contexts the crucial issue may be which definition of “atheist” (as opposed to “atheism”) is the most useful politically, especially in light of the bigotry that those who identify as atheists face. The fact that there is strength in numbers may recommend a very inclusive definition of “atheist” that brings anyone who is not a theist into the fold. Having said that, one would think that it would further no good cause, political or otherwise, to attack fellow non-theists who do not identify as atheists simply because they choose to use the term “atheist” in some other, equally legitimate sense.
If atheism is usually and best understood in philosophy as the metaphysical claim that God does not exist, then what, one might wonder, should philosophers do with the popular term, “New Atheism”? Philosophers write articles on and have devoted journal issues (French & Wettstein 2013) to the New Atheism, but there is nothing close to a consensus on how that term should be defined. Fortunately, there is no real need for one, because the term “New Atheism” does not pick out some distinctive philosophical position or phenomenon. Instead, it is a popular label for a movement prominently represented by four authors—Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens—whose work is uniformly critical of religion, but beyond that appears to be unified only by timing and popularity.
Okay, we do need to cogently respond.
Let’s therefore start the main discussion with a watershed moment in modern intellectual history. At the turn of the 1930’s, shock waves went through the Mathematics community when Godel presented his two key results: [1] once we deal with sufficiently complex mathematical systems, no axiomatic scheme will be both comprehensive and coherent, [2] there is no constructive procedure that can build a limited axiomatic scheme that is demonstrably free of contradictions. In short, the view of Mathematics as the perfection of rational certainty on generally acceptable axioms was dead and nearly a century later remains dead.
Nor is this isolable to Mathematics and its daughter science, computing. As Mathematics can be seen as the [study of the] logic of structure and quantity, where core elements emerge from the distinct identity of a possible world, this result is right there in the roots of how we understand reality and address reasoning. In short, Mathematics and other major movements of reasoning are faith ventures, aspects of the wider worldviews challenge of responsible, reasonable views anchored on tenable first plausibles.
It is in that humbling context that we can responsibly take up the challenge of warrant for worldviews. (Of course, for details kindly cf. here on in context for a 101. This is a summary for purposes of focussed discussion.)
Is ethical theism a reasonable, responsible, rational worldview? Is it reasonable to believe in God? Is there responsible warrant for a theistic view in a day of aggressive atheistical agendas? Thrice over, yes.
Why do I so boldly say this?
First, let us note the logic of being and its import for the nature and roots of reality. Notice, I have been literally pointing to this from the OP on, only to meet with repeated evasion and doubling down on the atheistical escape talking point on default views. Sorry, we can set such dogmatism and defaults aside and deal with worldviews warrant as a general intellectual challenge to be addressed not dodged.
Existence is a reality to be understood, as is non-existence.
Start with the genuine no-thing, non-being. Such has no causal powers [and we see temporal-causal chains all around us], so were there ever utter no-thing, such would forever obtain. A first result then, is that if a world now manifestly is, SOMETHING always was. Reality is eternal and must be explained on a principle of existence that can sustain eternality. So, to the logic of being as a pivotal explanatory framework:
0: Utter non-being cannot account for being, so SOMETHING always was, the question being, of what nature.
1: We can consider candidates to be, and can see that some [square circles] are impossible of being in any possible world. Such is because they have in them claimed essential characteristics that stand in mutual contradiction and so are infeasible in any sufficient description or actualisation of a compossible state of affairs. (And yes, we just defined possible worlds.)
2: Other candidates are feasible, i.e. they may exist in at least one PW. A fire, dependent on heat, oxidiser, fuel and combustion chain reaction is paradigmatic. Such on/off enabling factors are key causal factors showing that a fire is contingent.
3: Accordingly, we distinguish two classes of PB’s: contingent [CB] and necessary [NB]. NB’s are present in any possible world and are easiest understood as being integral parts of the framework for any PW. As an example, any distinct PW, say W, must have a distinguishing feature A, that marks it apart from a near neighbour W’, so we may see a structure: W = {A|~A}, thus recognise how two-ness is structural in any world being.
4: This is a non-trivial result as it frames the core quantities and structures of Mathematics: the Naturals, N, thence Z, Q, R, C, transfinites, infinitesimals, hyperreals and up to surreals. The logic of structure and quantity, in its core, is framework to any PW and so our actual world. Hence, the power of logic and mathematics.
5: Necessary beings are real, and neither began to be nor can they cease from being, and as two bonuses, Mathematics is about abstract entities and is deeply embedded in the currently most prestigious disciplines, the sciences. (Try to imagine a world without two-ness or where it ceases to be — impossible.) Again, a non-trivial result, we must face eternality of reality.
6: We thus have necessary beings as eternal and a reality that is eternal, so we see that the two go together, we are seeing the need for a necessary being root of reality. The issue is not, if such, but which such.
7: One constraint on this, is that our cosmos exhibits finite stage temporal causal succession, and credibly had a beginning. Where, attempts to extend to an underlying sub-verse actually pose a candidate NB world root. The question is viability.
8: If we try to extend the world, we see that on thermodynamics, a long enough past yields heat death, dissipation of centres of concentrated energy, and that fluctuations would point to Boltzmann brain scenarios as overwhelmingly more likely than the sort of world we see.
9: Likewise, a fine tuned world fitted for C-chem, cell based life is a challenge. Walker and Davies:
In physics, particularly in statistical mechanics, we base many of our calculations on the assumption of metric transitivity, which asserts that a system’s trajectory will eventually [–> given “enough time and search resources”] explore the entirety of its state space – thus everything that is phys-ically possible will eventually happen. It should then be trivially true that one could choose an arbitrary “final state” (e.g., a living organism) and “explain” it by evolving the system backwards in time choosing an appropriate state at some ’start’ time t_0 (fine-tuning the initial state). In the case of a chaotic system the initial state must be specified to arbitrarily high precision. But this account amounts to no more than saying that the world is as it is because it was as it was, and our current narrative therefore scarcely constitutes an explanation in the true scientific sense.
We are left in a bit of a conundrum with respect to the problem of specifying the initial conditions necessary to explain our world. A key point is that if we require specialness in our initial state (such that we observe the current state of the world and not any other state) metric transitivity cannot hold true, as it blurs any dependency on initial conditions – that is, it makes little sense for us to single out any particular state as special by calling it the ’initial’ state. If we instead relax the assumption of metric transitivity (which seems more realistic for many real world physical systems – including life), then our phase space will consist of isolated pocket regions and it is not necessarily possible to get to any other physically possible state (see e.g. Fig. 1 for a cellular automata example).
[–> or, there may not be “enough” time and/or resources for the relevant exploration, i.e. we see the 500 – 1,000 bit complexity threshold at work vs 10^57 – 10^80 atoms with fast rxn rates at about 10^-13 to 10^-15 s leading to inability to explore more than a vanishingly small fraction on the gamut of Sol system or observed cosmos . . . the only actually, credibly observed cosmos]
Thus the initial state must be tuned to be in the region of phase space in which we find ourselves [–> notice, fine tuning], and there are regions of the configuration space our physical universe would be excluded from accessing, even if those states may be equally consistent and permissible under the microscopic laws of physics (starting from a different initial state). Thus according to the standard picture, we require special initial conditions to explain the complexity of the world, but also have a sense that we should not be on a particularly special trajectory to get here (or anywhere else) as it would be a sign of fine–tuning of the initial conditions. [ –> notice, the “loading”] Stated most simply, a potential problem with the way we currently formulate physics is that you can’t necessarily get everywhere from anywhere (see Walker [31] for discussion). [“The “Hard Problem” of Life,” June 23, 2016, a discussion by Sara Imari Walker and Paul C.W. Davies at Arxiv.]
10: Circular causation requires a not yet stage to reach back and cause itself. A disguised appeal to non-being. Non-starter.
11: We need a finitely remote, NB world root that is not subject to heat death. No evolutionary materialistic candidate can meet such a requirement, apart from its self referential incoherence. As a reminder, Haldane:
“It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [“When I am dead,” in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. (NB: DI Fellow, Nancy Pearcey brings this right up to date (HT: ENV) in a current book, Finding Truth.)]
12: In addition, the required NB world root is constrained by the existence of rational, responsible, significantly free, morally governed creatures — us. Starting with rationality, we are inescapably morally governed through duties to truth, right reason, prudence (so, warrant), sound conscience, neighbourliness, fairness, justice etc. This can only be founded in the world-root, on pain of ungrounded ought, as we can see in attempts to dismiss such.
13: This requires a causally, morally and rationally adequate NB world root entity. If one objects to the following, this is phil, simply put up an alternative: _ and warrant cogently on comparative difficulties: _ and why is it held to be better ____ . At any rate, something is needed for record. KF
388
Kairosfocus
July 15, 2019 at 5:04 am
F/N: I should note on deductive frames of argument on sets of premises or axioms, first, that we often have high confidence in some set of axioms or premises but do not necessarily recognise what they entail, so an exploration of a logic-model world is useful, especially where it draws out necessary truths or entities that obtain for any PW. And in cases of models of restricted scope they may have in them in common archetypes sufficient to apply to our world as a tested, reliable, insightful model — that’s how scientific explanatory constructs work. Which then brings in inference to the best current explanation as a form of inductive warrant. So, it is by no means useless to explore theistic arguments, especially if this leads us to seriously examine alternative world-frame first plausibles. As I will argue onwards, DV, it is the challenge of comparative difficulties across alternatives that lends strength to ethical theism. Above, we have already seen that we need a finitely remote NB world root to adequately account for a world with rational [not merely computational], responsible, morally governed creatures in it. KF
388
Kairosfocus
July 15, 2019 at 5:04 am
F/N: I should note on deductive frames of argument on sets of premises or axioms, first, that we often have high confidence in some set of axioms or premises but do not necessarily recognise what they entail, so an exploration of a logic-model world is useful, especially where it draws out necessary truths or entities that obtain for any PW. And in cases of models of restricted scope they may have in them in common archetypes sufficient to apply to our world as a tested, reliable, insightful model — that’s how scientific explanatory constructs work. Which then brings in inference to the best current explanation as a form of inductive warrant. So, it is by no means useless to explore theistic arguments, especially if this leads us to seriously examine alternative world-frame first plausibles. As I will argue onwards, DV, it is the challenge of comparative difficulties across alternatives that lends strength to ethical theism. Above, we have already seen that we need a finitely remote NB world root to adequately account for a world with rational [not merely computational], responsible, morally governed creatures in it. KF
392
Kairosfocus
July 15, 2019 at 8:25 am
F/N: Let’s begin to look at at least some version of typical theistic arguments.
Above, we have set a context, where logic of being and world roots requisites lead to the obvious reasonableness of ethical theism, especially once it is seen that God is a serious candidate NB and root of reality, so either he is impossible of being or else he is actual. In absence of cogent positive reason to reject the reality of God — default atheism sans warrant to reject God as possible does not make the cut — it is very reasonable to accept that God exists.
In turn this readily explains the evident fine tuning of the cosmos that supports cell based, C Chem aqueous medium life, and the FSCO/I in that life from the “simple” — NOT! — cell across body plans to our own. It would make sense of our rationality as a divine endowment. It grounds us as having quasi-infinite worth, thence fundamental equality as in God’s image, thus rights, in-built natural law, sound conscience and more. So, we see that a theistic worldview –pace much current rhetoric — is not to be despised as though it were little better than rank superstition or belief in fairies or whatever one may see.
So, that holds before and independent of whether the classical theistic arguments are, valid, sound, rationally plausible, convincing, compelling to one and all, etc.
Sadly, it needs to be said in a world where– this is fair comment — there is a lot of contempt, dismissiveness, disdain, prejudice or even bigotry directed at ethical theism from fairly influential quarters.
It is time for a serious rethink in such quarters.
394
Kairosfocus
July 15, 2019 at 8:50 am
F/N: I have found an interesting discussion by a certain “Christopher” — Christ-bearer — here, that I wish to now clip as food for thought:
It seems implausible that all religious people have been deceived completely. The existence of a Transcendent God is more plausible than a completely skeptical outlook on life.
“It seems much more likely that such self-analyzing and self-critical men as Augustine, Blaise Pascal and Kierkegaard were not totally deceived than that total skepticism is right. Unless it is true that no person in the history of the world has ever really been truly critical of his religious experience, then it follows that the reality of God has been critically established from human experience” (76).
This raises the issue that if every person who has ever believed in or had a life-transforming encounter with God [however well or poorly understood or expressed] has been delusional, such would bring the credibility of the human mind under serious doubt.
We are playing with big matches here, and would be well advised to be careful of what we may burn down.
In that context, let us contrast a common enough view (as summarised by the same) on arguments to God:
Most theists are not satisfied with proving God’s existence on experience alone. They went to establish rational proofs.
The Modern attitude toward proofs for God
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have offered proofs for the existence of God.
There are four basic categories of theistic proofs:
1) Teleological – argument from telos (design or purpose)
2) Cosmological (aetiological) arguments from causation
3) Ontological – argument from onto (being)
4) Moral – argument from morality
Peter Koëstenbaum stated that theistic proofs are “logically invalid, epistemologically defective and axiologically misplaced” (80).
Proofs are Psychologically Unconvincing
Rational proofs are generally unpersuasive to non-believers.
Some argue that the mystical theology, not rational theology is the draw for religion. William James thought this was so because human needs are deeper than the rational.
“Psychological persuasion precedes rational demonstration” (81).
Proofs are logically invalid
If God does not appear in any of the premises he cannot appear in the conclusion because a conclusion cannot be broader than the premises.
Also, if God appears in the premises than the argument begs the question.
[–> In response I note from 388: >>I should note on deductive frames of argument on sets of premises or axioms, first, that we often have high confidence in some set of axioms or premises but do not necessarily recognise what they entail, so an exploration of a logic-model world is useful, especially where it draws out necessary truths or entities that obtain for any PW. And in cases of models of restricted scope they may have in them in common archetypes sufficient to apply to our world as a tested, reliable, insightful model — that’s how scientific explanatory constructs work. Which then brings in inference to the best current explanation as a form of inductive warrant. So, it is by no means useless to explore theistic arguments, especially if this leads us to seriously examine alternative world-frame first plausibles. As I will argue onwards, DV, it is the challenge of comparative difficulties across alternatives that lends strength to ethical theism.>>]
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective
This argument holds that even if God exists we cannot rationally know that he exists.
Kant held that we can only know the thing as it appears to us and not the thing in and of itself.
Proofs are ontologically inadequate
This argues that what is rationally inescapable may not be real. We may be able to devise a rational argument for the existence of God, but that does not mean God exists.
The inescapability of a rational argument is based on the principle of non-contradiction but the principle of non-contradiction, while being rationally inescapable has not been proven to be necessarily true. [–> I of course beg to point out right away that such is part of distinct identity and is rightly a first principle of right reason! This one is really a bad sign of our times.]
Proofs are Axiologically Misplaced
The proof for the existence of God should not be the prime importance of one’s religious experience.
Relating to the Modern Attitude Toward Proofs
Modern criticism are of value to theists today, but should not warrant a retreat to fideism.
Proof or Persuasion?
If people are never persuaded by proof then there is not intellectual integrity in the world.
While a rational proof may not play as crucial a role as Rene Descartes held it to, it does not follow that it plays no role at all. Even if if were true that people always believed in God apart from evidence, it does not follow that they believed against the evidence.
A proof for God, if it is successful, leads only to the belief that there is a God, not necessarily a belief in that God . . . . Why do some great minds reject theistic proofs?
1) Some atheists accept no kinds of proof.
2) Some do not allow the types of arguments for God that they allow elsewhere.
3) Some choose not to commit themselves to God despite the evidence.
A lack of persuasion by a theistic proof is not necessarily a fault of that proof, it is a result of a personal choice.
Proofs and logical validity
A formal invalidity of a single proof does not mean all proofs are invalid.
Even if no one has stated a formally valid proof yet, it does not follow that one won’t ever be stated.
Logical validity is not purely objective.
Not all rationally acceptable demonstration need to be valid deductions.
Are all Theistic Proofs Epistemologically Defective?
Kant’s objections are rested on the unfounded assumption that all true knowledge is modeled after the empirical/mathematical knowledge of Newtonian science.
Kant’s consistent agnosticism is not livable because it is self-defeating.
The dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is an unfounded assumption.
Each argument or theistic proof must be examined on its own grounds. One cannot reject all theistic proofs a priori . . .
. . . with Plantinga as was already cited in his lecture on two dozen or so theistic arguments:
TWO DOZEN (OR SO) THEISTIC ARGUMENTS
Lecture Notes by Alvin Plantinga
I’ve been arguing that theistic belief does not (in general) need argument either for deontological justification, or for positive epistemic status, (or for Foley rationality or Alstonian justification)); belief in God is properly basic. But doesn’t follow, of course that there aren’t any good arguments. Are there some? At least a couple of dozen or so.
Swinburne: good argument one that has premises that everyone knows. Maybe aren’t any such arguments: and if there are some, maybe none of them would be good arguments for anyone. (Note again the possibility that a person might, when confronted with an arg he sees to be valid for a conclusion he deeply disbelieves from premises he know to be true, give up (some of) those premises: in this way you can reduce someone from knowledge to ignorance by giving him an argument he sees to be valid from premises he knows to be true.) [–> this is a key]
These arguments are not coercive in the sense that every person is obliged to accept their premises on pain of irrationality. Maybe just that some or many sensible people do accept their premises (oneself)
What are these arguments like, and what role do they play? They are probabilistic, either with respect to the premises, or with respect to the connection between the premises and conclusion, or both. They can serve to bolster and confirm (‘helps’ a la John Calvin); perhaps to convince.
Distinguish two considerations here: (1) you or someone else might just find yourself with these beliefs; so using them as premises get an effective theistic arg for the person in question. (2) The other question has to do with warrant, with conditional probability in epistemic sense: perhaps in at least some of these cases if our faculties are functioning properly and we consider the premises we are inclined to accept them; and (under those conditions) the conclusion has considerable epistemic probability (in the explained sense) on the premises . . .
So, it is time to do some thinking about how we think and whether our thinking is as coherent as we believe. Plantinga on reversing knowledge is especially telling.
396
Kairosfocus
July 15, 2019 at 9:04 am
F/N: How I reviewed skeletal form theistic proofs back in 2003, in presenting an intro to phil course:
3. Theistic “Proofs”
Perhaps, it is wisest to start with Pascal’s Wager: given the vital importance and potential consequences of the question whether God is/is not, as the core of all worldviews, and the rough balance of the arguments, one faces a forced, momentous choice.
For, if one “bets” that God is not, and is wrong in the end, s/he has lost all – one’s soul. If one has bet that God is, and is eventually proved wrong, one still has lived by a manner of life that is arguably at least as good as the alternative, and has lost nothing – for one would then face oblivion as all other men do.
Pascal, father of probability theory, therefore argues that on the balance of expectations (= probability x payoff – cost) the bet that God is, is far better – a case of comparative difficulties at work. His underlying point is that if you then sincerely seek God, God will meet you, so that you can come to know God through personal experience.
To see what that “rough balance” looks like, we first explore the classic theistic arguments to God, using modern examples[2] from the families of such “proofs” presented and summarised by Thomas Aquinas in his famous Summa Theologica:
B. Cosmological:
(NB: This appears out of the classical order, as IMHO it makes A far more clear if this is done, by distinguishing and rationalising “contingent” and “necessary” beings. This is an example of a cumulative argument.):
1. Some contingent beings exist. (E.g.: us, a tree or a fruit, an artifact, the planets and stars, etc. — anything that might not have existed, i.e. is caused.)
2. Contingent beings do not exist by themselves – that is in part what “contingent” means – so they require a necessary being as their ultimate cause.
3. If any contingent being exists, then a necessary being exists.
4. Thus, there exists a necessary being, the ultimate cause of the existence of the many contingent beings in the cosmos.
A. Ontological:
1. If God exists, his existence is necessary. (NB link to B.4 just above.)
2. If God does not exist, his existence is impossible.
3. Either God exists or he does not exist.
4. God’s existence is either necessary or impossible.
5. But, God’s existence is possible (i.e. not impossible).
6. So, God’s existence is necessary.
C. Teleological/design:
1. Highly complex objects with intricate, interacting parts are produced by intelligent designers, at least so far as we can determine from cases where we do directly know the cause.
2. The universe (and/or a specific part of it[3]) is just such a highly complex object.
3. Probably, it is the result of intelligent design.
4. But, the scope/complexity of the universe is such that only God could be its designer.
5. Probably, there is a God.
D. Moral:
1. People, in practice, invariably act as though there are binding moral obligations. (For instance, as C. S. Lewis points out, that is how we quarrel.)
2. Probably, such objective, binding moral obligations exist.
3. Probably, unless there is a God, there cannot be objectively binding moral obligations.
4. Probably, there is a God who is the author of the moral order of the universe.
E. Religious experience:
1. If and only if God exists, can God reveal himself to us — through direct encounters/revelations, and/or through miracles, and/or through indirect witness (such as the voice of conscience or the glories of creation, or the intellectual and moral incoherence of other views about ultimate reality), etc.
2. A great many people report that they have had just such experiences of/encounters with/discoveries about God; often sensing union with and/or the utter otherness of God.
3. Many of these are in the list of greatest minds and/or greatest lives in human history.
4. It is extremely unlikely that all of these people are lying, mistaken or deluded.
5. It is therefore highly probable that God exists, as the ground of such experiences. (This argument brings us back to Pascal’s wager.)
These arguments are of valid — or at least inductively strong — forms, and they mutually reinforce like the strands and fibres in a rope[4], but objections can be made to at least some of their premises. However, such rejection comes at a price:
Cosmological: major objections assert that the universe may be eternal, the result of an infinite chain of contingent beings and cause-effect links, and/or that the universe’s existence is a brute – inexplicable – fact. (The first runs head-on into the 2nd law of thermodynamics, which implies that the universe is running down so probably is not infinitely old; but more importantly, the above argument makes no assumptions about the age of the cosmos. The second main objection in effect rejects the principle of sufficient reason: if things happen, there is a good/adequate reason for it. Which alternative is more plausible/ “reason”-able?)
Ontological: from premises # 4 & 5, God’s existence is only possible if it is necessary – inviting the objection that God’s existence is impossible, but this is in turn a very strong claim (and far harder to prove than to assert)!
Design: Objections try to deny the link between the observed complexity of the universe or objects in it and the existence of an Intelligent Designer, aka God. Or, they may point to the gap between the Designer and the God people wish to worship. (The latter is largely irrelevant: teleological arguments do not set out as a rule, to prove ALL that we may wish to know about God, just to argue that the design in the cosmos implies a Designer. The former hinge on providing alternative explanations for complexity in the cosmos, in effect asserting that even very improbable complex systems, given enough time will happen by chance. But, for instance, the calculated odds that a living cell could arise by chance are estimated at ~ 1 in 10 ^ 40,000 – i.e. 1 followed by 40,000 zeroes, a fair number of pages worth. This is so close to impossible as makes no practical difference: it is not likely to have happened once in the whole known universe in any reasonable timeframe for its existence, usually judged at 10 – 15 billion years. Indeed, odds of 1 in 10 ^ 200 are generally regarded as effectively zero.)
Moral: often people simply assert that there are no binding obligations, or claim that there is no set of universally accepted moral principles. Others seek to suggest ways in which moral obligations can exist in a non-theistic world; or else simply say that these obligations are yet another brute – i.e. inexplicable — fact. (The common fact that relativists wish to assert binding moral principles themselves, such as “tolerance,” indicates that relativist claims are self-defeating, sometimes even hypocritical. Disagreement over principles needs not imply their non-existence, just that reasoning about morality has its pitfalls just like any other type of reasoning. Also, C S Lewis and others have highlighted that in fact when individuals and cultures speak of those they care about, they do assert a surprisingly consistent set of values. Evolutionary theories of morality run into difficulties explaining say, self-sacrificing behaviour, and may argue in a circle from “survival is good” to “good is survival.” Many moral obligations cut right across our instincts, to the point where our daily challenge is usually whether we should go with conscience or impulse. And, the “brute fact” claim is actually a major concession: “I cannot explain morality on the basis of my core beliefs, but I have to accept it as a fact.” If so, then why not accept a framework that can make good sense of morality?)
Religious Experience: Some object that religious experiences are simply subjective perceptions: i.e. that they are not veridical. Others add that such experiences are not publicly checkable, i.e. that they lack objectivity. Further, it may be pointed out that different traditions have different, conflicting experiences. (But, to say some religious experiences are not veridical is one thing; to claim that ALL are only subjective and/or delusional is another — especially given that some of those so indicted are central to the world’s intellectual and cultural history; e.g. Moses and his Law, Jesus of Nazareth, the Apostles and their experience of the resurrection of Christ, and a great many others, such as the great scientists Newton, Pascal and Maxwell. Further, just because experiences are mediated through our senses and consciousness does not imply that they are dubious, apart from specific reason to suspect delusion. Thirdly, if we insist on public tests for all experiences, then we face an infinite regress. And, it is more appropriate to observe that there are conflicting interpretations of the experiences rather than contradictory experiences as such; especially as regards union with God and/or of God’s utter otherness.)
Thus, we see that there are no universally compelling theistic arguments, but that rejecting them all comes at a metaphysical price that may be steeper than one is willing to pay.
Okay, there is some meat on the table, so we may ponder together.
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Kairosfocus
July 15, 2019 at 10:00 am
F/N: What is the main anti-theistic case? (Other than, default and no evidence claims.)
Now that the logical form problem of evil is blunted, it boils down to the evolutionary materialistic view on origins, presented as known fact. Which immediately brings out why the ID issue is such a hot button topic. For, we know about complex, coherent, fine tuned, functionally specific complex organisation and associated information and where they come from: intelligently directed configuration. On trillions of observed cases. Backed up by analysis of blind search, needle in haystack challenges.
So, we have a reason to understand the intensity of polarisation against the design inference on empirically tested, reliable sign.
KF
PS: Recall, Dembski’s summary on Boethius:
In his Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius states the following paradox: “If God exists, whence evil? But whence good, if God does not exist?” . [/QUOTE]
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