The Ghost of Paley
Posts: 1703
Joined: Oct. 2005
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| Quote | The weak anthropic principle is not concerned with whether or not the universe would support life with different laws and constants. The weak anthropic principle does concern whether the universe is life-friendly (F), contains life(L), and is naturalistic (N).
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Yes, this is true for at least one definition. I have heard other definitions (for example, I quoted two earlier). But I'm challenging whether their version of WAP really encompasses the argument they think they're addressing, let alone the observations themselves. I've said from the beginning that they've established what their pinched definitions allowed them to establish. I'm just skeptical that their definitions match most theists's.
| Quote | Where does Bayes "demand" that observations not relevant to the probabilities of interest be conditioned for? The existence of life must be conditioned for when dealing with the WAP, while the fine-tuning is accurately represented by P(F|N)<<1.
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Ogee, I really do understand their paper. I just disagree with their background assumptions.
| Quote | Yet another problem for your objections is that the inclusion of these observations in F would change the conditional probabilities: obviously it can't change L (which we know to be 1 and which is used only to condition the other two), so it could only change N, but this is begging the question.
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Not necessarily. It could change the likelihood of N (most physicists think it doesn't, and I realise that), but these observations come straight from N's background information. If it didn't, scientists wouldn't be trying to account for them in their TOEs. In fact, inflation itself is an attempt to address some anthropic coinci-dinks. I can't stress this enough: these observations didn't have to be true. In fact, everything I've read suggested that these facts were initially greeted with surprise.
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I'm not: I'm just arguing that the conditional probability predicated on all the observations is low. |
Which can't be done without assuming a prioiri that the observations decrease the probability of N, which renders the argument circular. |
It would be circular if I wanted the low probability built into the assumptions. But as I've said before, I do not believe these anthropic coincidences narrow the likelihood of N by definition. In fact, I can think of several natualistic models (Smolin's evo universe, multiverse models) which use these coincidences as evidence. These theories are entirely materialistic. If true, then Paley's definition of F would increase P(N). Wouldn't that be embarrassing? 
| Quote | | You're a real piece of work: toss an insult and then plead for a civil discussion. You can stick your hypocrisy and your false civility up your ass. |
Oh my, I'm debating with an idEOlogue. Tell me Ogee, why is this issue so emotional for you? If I'm wrong, I can accept it and move on, but if I'm right, I have a feeling that you're gonna be really depressed. Why? For a group of people who don't believe in ####, you atheists sure like immersing yourself in the furnace.
Ogee, this response will have to do until Monday.
By the way, does anyone understand what I'm trying to say?
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Dey can't 'andle my riddim.
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