MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing) one time that some of the quotes being read from the deposition could only go to impeach the witness.
THE COURT: I think he was complaining about the method of using the deposition and not whether or not it— Once it's in the record, it's in there.
MR. WILLIAMS: I just wanted to make sure. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Cearley, are you ready to call your next?
MR. CEARLEY: Yes, sir. Michael Ruse will be the first witness, your Honor, and Mr. Jack Novik will handle the direct examination of the witness.
Thereupon,
MICHAEL E. RUSE,
called on behalf of the plaintiffs herein, after having been first duly sworn or affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. NOVIK:
Q Would you state your full name for the record?
A Michael Escott Ruse.
Q Have you been sworn?
A I have.
Q What is your address? Where do you live?
A I live at 44 Edinburg Road, North, Ontario, Canada.
Q Are you a Canadian citizen?
A I am indeed.
Q And what is your occupation?
A I'm professor of history and philosophy at the University of Guelph, Ontario.
Q What is your particular area of academic specialty?
A I'm a historian and philosopher of science. Typically, history and philosophy of biology. I also teach other areas in philosophy, philosophy of religion and philosophy of education. General philosophy.
Q Doctor Ruse, is this your curriculum vitae?
A Yes.
MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, this has previously been marked as Exhibit Ninety-Four for identification. Our copies of the exhibits are not yet here. I'd be glad to pass you a copy. We will fill it in with the—
THE COURT: Okay. It will be received. And if you would, make sure it's in the record.
MR. NOVIK: Yes, sir, I'll do that.
In light of Doctor Ruse's qualifications as described in the curriculum vitae, which has previously been made available to the defendants, I move that Doctor Ruse be qualified as an expert in philosophy of science and
MR. NOVIK: (Continuing) history of science, in particular, the philosophy and history of biology.
THE COURT: Mr. Williams.
MR. WILLIAMS: No objection, your Honor. MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)
Q Doctor Ruse, will you please describe to the Court your understanding, as a philosopher and historian of science, of what science is today?
A Well, Mr. Novik, I think the most important thing about science, if I was going to extract one essential characteristic, is that it be predominantly brought in the law. In other words, what one's trying to do in science is explained by law, whereby "law" one means unguided, natural regularities.
Q When you say "law", you mean natural law?
A I mean natural law. I mean Boyle's Law, Mendel's Law, Cook's Law.
Q Doctor, is there any one single definition of science?
A I wouldn't say there is one single definition of science, but I think the philosophers today would generally agree on that point.
Q Are there other attributes of science that philosophers today
would generally agree are important in defining what is a science and what
is not?
A Well, you say philosophers. Let's broaden it. I hope we can include historians. And I'd like to think that scientist agree with what we say.
Yes. I think what one's got to do now is start teasing out some of the attributes of science, starting with the notion of law.
Particularly, science is going to be explanatory.
Another thing there, another very important aspect of science is it's going to be testable against the empirical world. Another characteristic, and perhaps we can stop with these, is that it's going to be tentative. It's going to be, in some sense, not necessarily the final word.
Q Would you explain to the Court what you mean in saying that science must be explanatory?
A Yes. When I talk about science, or when philosophers and scientists talk about science being explanatory, what we mean is that in some sense we can show that phenomena follow as a consequence of law. Perhaps I can give you an example to sort of explain a little bit more what I mean. And let's take a very mundane example. I like to take mundane examples because one of the things I really want to point out is that science isn't that different from the rest of human thinking.
Suppose, for example, you've got, say, a baseball which
A (Continuing) is being pitched from the pitcher to the hitter, and the ball goes along and then suddenly it dips down. The guy swings and the ball is not there, not— You know, I suspect the pitcher, you know, might start thinking in terms of divine intervention.
But a scientist would be saying things like, well, now, why did this happen. Well, let's look at Galileo's Laws; let's look at laws to do with air resistance together with initial conditions like the speed the ball was thrown and so on and so forth.
Q In connection with these characteristics of science that you've identified, can you tell us what you mean by testable?
A Yes. Again, it all follows, I think, very much from the nature
of law. A scientific theory is not a hypothesis of a body of science. It
must, in some sense, put itself up against the real world. That is to say,
one must be able to do experiments, either in the lab or out in nature
and try and get inferences from the main body of science, and then to see
whether or not they follow and whether or not they actually obtain in the
world. I think one would want to say that any science that's worth its
salt is certainly going to have a lot of positive evidence in its favor.
More than that, I think a very important aspect of science is that somehow
it must
A (Continuing) be sort of self-generating. In other words, a scientific hypothesis, a scientific theory is not only going to explain what it set out to explain, but it's going to lead to new areas as well, and one has got to be able to test it in this respect.
Q Is it fair, then, to say that a science has to generate new facts which then can be tested against a theory?
A Well, it's not generating the facts, but it's generating inferences about expected facts. Do you want an example or two?
Q No. That's fine.
In connection with the attributes of science and this issue of testability, does the concept of falsifiability mean anything to you?
A Yes. The concept of falsifiability is something which has been talked about a great deal by scientists and others recently. It's an idea which has been made very popular by the Austrian-English philosophist, Karl Popper. Basically, the idea of falsifiability is that there must be, as it were, if something is a genuine scientific theory, then there must, at least, conceivably be some evidence which could count against it. Now, that doesn't mean to say that there's actually going to be evidence. I mean, one's got to distinguish, say, between something
A
(Continuing) being falsifiable and something being actually falsified.
But
what Popper argues is that if something is a genuine science, then at least in
the fault experiment, you ought to be able to think of something which would
show that it's wrong.
For
example, Popper is deliberately distinguishing science from, say, something
like religion. Popper is not running down religion. He's just saying it's not
science. For example, you take, say, a religious statement like God is love, there's
nothing in the empirical world which would count against this in a believer. I
mean, whatever you see-- You see, for example, a terrible accident or something
like this, and you say, "Well, God is love. It's free will," or, for
example, the San Francisco earthquake, you say, "Well, God is love; God is
working his purpose out. We don't understand, but nothing is going to make me
give this up."
Now,
with science, you've got to be prepared to give up.
Q I was
going to ask you for an example of falsifiability in the realm of science.
A Well,
let's take evolutionary theory, for example. Suppose, I mean, contemporary
thought on evolutionary theory believes that evolution is never going to
reverse itself in any significant way. In other words, the dodo,
251.
A
(Continuing) the dinosaurs are gone; they are not going to come back.
Suppose,
for example, one found, say, I don't know, somewhere in the desolate north up
in Canada, suppose one found evidence in very, very old rocks, say, of mammals
and lots and lots of mammals and primates, this sort of thing, and then nothing
for what scientists believe to be billions of years, and then suddenly, mammals
come back again.
Well,
that would obviously be falsifying evidence of evolution theory. Again, I want
to make the point, you've got to distinguished between something actually being
shown false and something being in principle falsifiable. I mean, the fact that
you've got no contrary evidence doesn't mean to say that you don't have a
theory. I mean, it could be true.
Q The
last characteristic you mentioned was that science was tentative. Can you
explain that characteristic of science?
A Yes.
Again, this is all very much bound up with the points I've been making earlier.
What one means when one says that science has got to be tentative is that
somewhere at the back of the scientist's mind, he, or increasingly she, has got
to be prepared to say at some point, "Well, enough is enough; I've got to
give this
252.
A (Continuing)
theory up." It doesn't mean to say you are going to be every Monday
morning sort of requestioning your basic principles in science, but it does
mean that if something is scientific, at least in principle, you've got to be
prepared to give it up.
Q
Doctor Ruse, in addition to those four characteristics, natural law,
explanation, testability and tentativeness, are there other characteristics of
science, methodological characteristics of science which serves to distinguish
science from non-scientific endeavors?
A Yes,
I think there are. of course, one starts to get down from the body of science
and starts to talk more about the community of scientists. Fairly obviously,
scientists have got in some sense to try to be objective. One has got to, even
though scientists might have personal biases, personal issues, at some level
you've got to try to filter these out in science.
Science
has got to be public. In other words, if you've got some sort of scientific
ideas, you've got to be prepared to let your fellow scientists see it.
Science
has got to be repeatable. Fairly obviously, again I say, science has got to try
to be honest. I mean, obviously not all scientists all the time have been all
or any of these things. But speaking of science as sort of a general body of
knowledge and a body of men and women
253.
A
(Continuing) working on it, these are the sorts of ideals we are aiming for.
They are not that different from philosophers and lawyers.
Q How
does science deal with a new observation or new experimental data which is not
consistent with a theory that science has generally accepted to be true for a
period of time?
A Well,
you know, it's a little difficult to answer that question because what can one
say. It depends on the scientific theory which is threatened. It depends on the
new evidence.
I guess
a good analogy would say science is something as happens here. Suppose, for
example, there was some question about whether or not somebody is going to be
convicted of a crime. Well, you have them up, you have a trial, and then let's
suppose they are found guilty. Now, they are found guilty beyond all reasonable
doubt. You accept the supposition. That doesn't mean to say that never, ever
could you open up the case again.
For
example, if somebody else was found the next week committing exactly the same
crime, you'd probably look very hard at the first one. So, I mean, there are
things that would make you change your mind.
And I
think it's the same with science. I mean, if you just establish something, and
then something pretty
254.
A
(Continuing) massive comes up fairly soon afterwards, then you're going to
rethink it. On the other hand, suppose somebody has been convicted twenty years
ago, and his mother on the deathbed says, "Well, he didn't really do
it." Well, you might say, "I'm not too sure about that."
It's
the same with science. If you've got something which is really working, really
going well, lots of evidence for it, you get something which seems to be a bit
against it, I mean, you don't ignore it. You say, "Let's try and explain
it."
On the
other hand, you don't suddenly say, ooh, I've lost everything. I've got to
start again.
Q Do
scientists work at trying to fit the new data into the old theory?
A They
work at trying to fit it in. What can I say. mean, sometimes they, I suspect
that first of all they are going to look very carefully at the data again.
Other scientists are going to see if the data really is what it's supposed to
be, try new experiments, so on and so forth.
Q
Doctor Ruse, have, you ever seen reference to observability as an attribute of
science?
A Well,
I've certainly seen reference to it in the scientific creationist literature.
255.
Q How
do creation scientist use the term "observability"?
A Well,
they seem to make it an essential characteristic of science, and they tend to
use it in the sense of direct eyewitness observation.
Q Now,
as a philosopher of science, do you believe that observability is an attribute
of science?
A It's
funny you say that. Certainly empirical evidence is important, but I wouldn't
want to say that direct empirical evidence is important for every aspect of
every science. We don't see electrons, for example.
Q Why
is science not limited to the visible, to what you can, to what an observer can
actually see?
A Well,
because-- This takes us right to the heart of the way science works. I mean,
scientists pose some sort of hypothesis, some sort of idea, suppose about the
nature of the electrons, something like this. From this he tries to derive
inferences, ultimately trying to find something out about the real world, and
then you argue back to what you haven't seen.
I mean,
you don't see that I've got a heart, but you can infer that I've got a heart
from all of the observable characteristics like the fact that it thumps and so
on and so forth.
Q
Speaking of your heart, I note--
256.
A Yes.
It's thumping quite a bit at the moment.
Q --I
note that your latest book is titled _Darwinism Defended_. Does the title of
that book suggest that evolution is in question and that evolution is in need
of defense?
A
Certainly I hope not. Certainly-- Well, let me put it this way. I do not want
to imply that the happening of evolution, as we understand it today, is in any
sense under attack by credible scientists.
I am
concerned, I'm talking in the book about mechanisms, forces and so forth.
Q Do I
understand you to be drawing a distinction between the happening of evolution
and the mechanics of evolution?
A Yes.
Q And
what is that distinction?
A Well,
the happening of evolution is claims about the fact or the supposition that we
all today, and the fossil record is a function of the fact that we all evolved,
developed slowly over a long time from, to use Darwin's own phrase, one or a
few forms.
The
mechanism, the cause of evolution is -- what shall I say -- it's, I won't say
why, but it's the 'how did it happen' sort of question.
Q When
scientists today speak of the theory of
257.
Q
(Continuing) evolution, are they referring usually to the theory that evolution
happened, or are they referring to the theory about how evolution happened?
A Well,
I guess I'd have to say it tends to be used somewhat ambiguously. Sometimes you
see it one way; sometimes you see it the other way. To a great extent, I think
you have to look at the context in which the discussion occurs.
But I
think usually it's true to say that scientists today are concerned about the
mechanisms. They accept that evolution occurred.
Q Do
you know of any scientists other than the so-called creation scientists who
question the happening of evolution?
A No, I
don't really think I know anybody I would call a scientist. I say scientist in
the sense of professional, credible scientist. Now, certainly the creation
scientists want to argue that it didn't occur.
Q You
say that scientists today agree that evolution happened.
A Yes.
Q Why
is that so?
A Well,
quite simply, the evidence is overwhelming.
Q What
is the history of the consensus in the scientific community that evolution has
happened?
258.
A Well,
like everything, I think in Western intellectual thought, you could well go
back to the Greeks. But probably the story, at least as affects us, of the
scientific revolution picks up off Copernicus' work showing that the earth goes
around the sun and not vice versa.
I think
it's true to say that Copernicus' ideas and the ideas of the Copernicans
spurred a number of things which led ultimately to evolution thought.
For
example, on the one hand, one had the fact that even Copernicus' ideas put
certain pressure on the Bible taken literally. For example, in the Bible, it
talks of the sun stopping for Joshua, implying the sun moves. And people
pointed out-- In fact, Luther and Calvin pointed out, even before Copernicus
published, that this seemed to go against the truth of the Bible.
And as
people began to accept Copernicanism, they started to say, "Well, you
know, if one part is not literally true, maybe another part isn't either."
That was one thing.
Another
thing was although the Copernican theory, per se, doesn't talk about how things
actually came about, certainly it set people thinking this way. And certainly
during the eighteenth century, there was an awful lot of speculation and
hypothesizing about the way in which the
259.
A
(Continuing) universe might have come about through natural law.
And in
particular, there was a very popular hypothesis known as the nebular hypothesis
which was developed including part of this by the great German philosopher,
Immanuel Kant, which suggested the fact this universe of ours has evolved
gradually by natural law from clouds, clouds of gases.
So in
physics one is getting what I say analogical directions. Then in the biological
sciences themselves, people are finding more and more evidence which were
leading them to think that maybe Genesis wasn't quite all that could be said.
For
example, more and more fossils were being found, and people were starting to
realize that these fossils simply weren't just curiously shaped pieces of
stone, so on and so forth.
To cut
a long story short, I think by the end of the eighteen century a lot of people
were starting to think that maybe organisms had, in fact, developed slowly. In
fact, one of the first people to think up the idea was Charles Darwin's
grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, who used to write unbelievably bad verse all about
how we all evolved up from the oak tree and everything like this. Probably the
first really credible scientist to put
260.
A
(Continuing) everything together was a Frenchman by the name of Lamarck, Jean
Baptiste de Lamarck, who published a work on evolutionary science or
evolutionary theory in 1809.
After
that, people started new evolution ideas. They didn't much like them, but they
talked about them more and more. Certainly in the Anglo-Saxon world,
evolutionism got a big discussion with the publication in 1844 of a book by an
anonymous Scottish writer known as Robert Chambers.
So
again the people went on talking and talking and talking. Finally in 1859,
Charles Darwin published _Origin of Species_. And I think it's true to say that
within a very short time, and I mean a very short time, certainly the
scientific community was won over to evolutionism. And from that day on by the
professional body of scientist, certainly by biologist, I don't think evolution
has ever been questioned.
Q When
you say the scientific community was won over to evolution, I take it you mean
that shortly after the publication of _Origin of Species_, the scientific
community accepted that evolution happened, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q
Charles Darwin also proposed a theory of describing
261.
Q
(Continuing) the mechanics of evolution, did he not?
A He
did indeed.
Q What
theory was that?
A Well,
it was the theory of natural selection.
Q Now,
do scientist today generally agree about how evolution happened?
A No,
not at all. In fact, sort of looking about the courtroom at the moment, I can
see several people who, as it were, when they get outside start to disagree
very, very strongly indeed about the actual causes.
Q Can
you describe the nature of that debate about the mechanics of evolution that is
ongoing today?
A Yes.
I would say that if you like to use sort of a boxing metaphor, in one corner
you've got the more orthodox Darwinians who think that natural selection is
still a very, very major factor.
I don't
think anybody, even Darwin himself, ever thought that natural selection was all
there was to it. But certainly, you've got some people who want to argue that
natural selection still plays the major role.
On the
other hand, you've got some people who want to argue that there are other
factors which are probably very important random factors, some important
genetic drift -- I'm sure you will be hearing more about that -- and other
sorts of factors which could have been involved in evolution.
262.
Q
Doctor Ruse, you testified earlier that creation scientists often confuse the
difference between the happening of evolution and the how of evolution, is that
right?
A I did
indeed.
Q Would
you please explain what you meant by that, please?
A Well,
what they do is they'll, say, take a passage where a scientist, a biologist,
something like this, is talking about the question of causes, the question of
reasons, this sort of thing, and they will quote just this one sentence or half
a sentence, one paragraph, and then as it were, automatically assume and lead
the reader to assume that what's under question here is the actual occurrence
of evolution itself.
So one
gets, I think, this sort of mixing of the two.
Q
Doctor Ruse, are you familiar with creation science literature?
A Yes.
Q In
your book, _Darwinism Defended_, do you analyze creation science literature?
A Well,
I analyzed one work in particular. This is a work edited by Doctor Henry Morris
of the Institute for Creation Research.
It's
one-- It's not only edited by him, but I think
263.
A
(Continuing) there are some thirty other scientists, including Doctor Gish, who
were either, co-authors or co-consultants.
This is
the work which was published in 1974 call _Scientific Creationism_. It's a work
which was published in two versions. One was the public school edition, and the
other was the Christian school edition or the Christian edition.
I
analyzed the public school edition. It seemed to me that this was about as
frank and as full a statement of scientific creationism as one was likely to
find.
Q That
was analyzed in your book?
A That's
analyzed in the final two chapters in my book, yes.
Q In
addition to the book, _Scientific Creationism_-- Excuse me, Doctor Ruse. There
are two editions of _Scientific Creationism_. One is the sectarian edition, and
one is the public school edition. Which of those did you consider in your book?
A I
considered the public school edition.
Q
Doctor Ruse, in addition to _Scientific Creationism_, the book _Scientific
Creationism_, have you read scientific literature excuse me creation science
literature extensively?
A Yes,
I have.
264.
Q Could
you describe some of the books that you've read?
A Well,
I've read a couple of books by Doctor Gish. I've read _Evolution: The Fossils
Say No_ and the book for children, _Dinosaurs: Those Terrible Lizards_. I
should add, by the way, that Doctor Gish and I are sort of old friends, old
adversaries. And we've debated together, and I've been reading this stuff for a
while now. Also, I read what I believe is taken to be the classic by creation
scientists. That's the _Genesis Flood_ by, I think, Whitcomb and Morris.
I have
read a couple of recent books by a man called Parker, one which is his
testimony on how he got converted to creationism, and another which is a very
recent book, the most recent book I've found by the creationists, called
_Creation_, something on the facts or the facts say so, something like that.
_The
Handy-Dandy Evolution Refuter_ by a chap called Kofahl, and another book by
him. _Creation Explanation: A Scientific Alternative to Evolution_, that's by
Kofahl and I think somebody called Segraves.
Q Is it
fair to say you have read widely in creation science literature?
A Well,
I think so.
Q Have
you considered the creation science literature
265.
Q
(Continuing) in your scholarship?
A Yes.
Q Have
you examined that literature as a philosopher and historian of science?
A Yes,
I have.
Q You
testified earlier that creation scientists often confuse the difference between
the happening and the how of evolution. And you suggested they do so in part by
taking quotations out of context. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Do
you know any examples of that?
A Yeah.
Well, for example, in Parker's book, which I said was the most recent, I think,
or the most recent book I've come across by creationists, I think you'll find
at least one very flagrant example of that.
Q
Doctor Ruse, I'd like to show you a copy of Act 590?
A Yes.
Q Act
590 has previously been admitted as exhibit number twenty-nine.
Doctor
Ruse, I'd like to direct your attention to the references to creation science
in Act 590. In particular, I'd like to refer your attention to Section 4(a) of
the Statute.
As a
historian and philosopher of science and someone who has read extensively in
the creation science
266.
Q
(Continuing) literature, how does Act 590 relate to the body of creation
science literature that you have read?
A I
would say very closely indeed. In fact, so closely I would want to say
identical.
Q What
are the similarities that you see between the description of creation science
in Act 590 and creation science as it appears in the body of literature that
you've read?
A Well,
a number of things. But I think what one would want to say is, there are at,
least three features which are obviously interrelated.
First
of all, one has this sort of stark opposition between two supposed positions,
so-called creation science and so-called evolution science. And one is often
sort of an either/or, this sort of notion of balanced treatment of these two
models. Let's call that sort of a dual model approach.
Secondly,
the fact that creation science in 4(a) deals point by point with all and
virtually only the things that the scientific creationist deal with.
And
thirdly, the fact that 4(b) -- what shall I say -- this hybrid, this hodgepodge
known as evolution science appears described here, and once again that is
something which occurs, basically as a unit like this, I think, occurs only in
the scientific creationist literature.
267.
Q
Doctor Ruse, I'd like to explore each of those areas with you. First, what is
your understanding of the theory of creation?
A Well,
that the whole universe, including all organisms and particularly including
ourselves, was created by some sort of supernatural power very recently. As it
was tacked on, the fact that having done this, he or she decided to wipe a lot
out by a big flood.
Q Where
does that understanding of the theory of creation come from?
A Well,
my understanding comes from the reading of the scientific creationist
literature.
_THE
COURT:_ I'm sorry. I didn't catch what you said earlier. What was the question
and the response? Do you mind starting on that again?
_MR.
NOVIK:_ Not at all. Did you hear his understanding of the theory of creation?
_THE
COURT:_ Yes.
_MR.
NOVIK:_ I could start after that.
_THE
COURT:_ Start with that, if you would.
MR.
NOVIK: (Continuing)
Q What
is your understanding of the theory of creation?
A That
the world, the whole universe was created very
268.
A
(Continuing) recently. And when I talk about the whole universe, I'm talking
about all the organisms in it including ourselves.
And as
I said, sort of added on as sort of a -- what shall I say -- a sub-clause, that
some time after it was done that everything or nearly everything was sort of
wiped out by a big flood.
Q How
was that creation accomplished according to the theory of creation?
_MR.
WILLIAMS:_ Objection, your Honor, to the use of the term "the theory of
creation." As previously pursued in our Motion in Limine, the term
"theory of creation" is used nowhere within the Act.
_MR.
NOVIK:_ Your Honor, a few more questions, and I think that objection will
answer itself.
_THE
COURT:_ Okay, sir. Go ahead.
MR.
NOVIK: (Continuing)
Q
Doctor Ruse, I believe I asked you whether the creation you mentioned was
accomplished by any force?
A Yes.
By a creator.
Q Where
does your understanding of the theory of creation come from?
A Well,
from my reading of the scientific creationist literature.
Q Is
that theory of creation a part of Act 590?
269.
A Well,
I think so, yes.
Q Is
the creation, the theory of creation that you have identified in the creation
science literature the same as the creation science theory identified in Act
590?
A Yes.
Q Does
Act 590 mention a creator with a capital C?
A It
doesn't actually use the word.
Q Where
do you see in Act 590 the theory of creation?
A Well,
I see it very much in the first sentence of 4(a). And I think all the time when
looking at 4(a), one has got to compare it against 4(b) because these are
obviously intended as two alternative models.
And if
you look, for example, at 4(b), you see that evolution science means the
scientific evidences for evolution, inferences from those evidences.
We are
talking about scientific evidences. Scientific evidences for, well, what we
mean, a theory. Scientific evidences outside the context of a theory are really
not scientific evidences.
Q What
theory do the scientific evidences in 4(b) support?
A Well,
they are talking about this theory of evolution science. What I want to say is
if we go back to 4(a), then if we are going to start talking about scientific
evidences, then presumably we are talking about
270.
A
(Continuing) scientific evidences for some theory. And analogously, what we are
talking about is the theory of creation.
Q Where
in Act 590 do you see a reference to a creator?
A Well,
again, as I say, I don't see the word creator. I think the, Act is very
carefully written so that I wouldn't.
However,
I think if you look at 4(a)(1), sudden creation of the universe, energy and
life from nothing, I think a creator is clearly presupposed here.
Again,
if you look at 4(b)(1), which says "Emergence" -- that's not a word I
care for particularly -- "Emergence" by naturalistic processes of the
universe from disordered matter and emergence of life from non-life.
Now,
you will notice that the key new word here is naturalistic processes, which
doesn't occur in 4(a)(1), sudden creation.
So my
inference is that we are dealing with non-naturalistic processes in 4(a)(1) and
non-naturalistic processes, meaning by definition a creator.
Q
Looking at--
_THE
COURT:_ Wait a second. Let's go back over that again.
A What
we are dealing with is the question of to what extent 4(a)(1) implies some sort
of non-naturalistic
271.
A
(Continuing) creator.
And the
point I was trying to make, your Honor, was that I think if you look at
4(b)(1), it says emergence--
_THE
COURT:_ Okay. Fine.
A
--emergence by naturalistic processes. I feel very strongly that to understand
4(a) you've got to compare it all the time with 4(b) and vice versa. And my
point simply was that 4(b) talks about naturalistic processes, so presumably in
4(a), which doesn't, we're talking about non-naturalistic processes.
Q In
4(a), the language to compare with naturalistic processes you said was sudden
creation, is that correct?
A Yes.
Right.
Q Now,
looking at 4(b)(3) and 4(a)(3), can you comment on those sections with respect
to the issue of creator?
A
4(b)(3), "Emergence by mutation and natural selection of present living
kinds from simple earlier kinds." Again, the word "kind" has a
superfluous connotation. It makes me feel a bit uncomfortable, certainly in
talking about it in the context of science.
Q But
in 4(b)(3), does the Statute make reference to naturalistic processes?
A Well,
it doesn't mention naturalistic processes. It doesn't use the word
"naturalistic," but clearly one is talking about naturalistic processes.
Mutation, natural
272.
A
(Continuing) selection, these the epitome of naturalistic processes.
Q Yes,
sir. And how does that compare with 4(a)(3)?