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Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,19:28   

Zachriel,

The concern I'm raising here is not epistemological. I'm not asking how we can justify inductive inference. I'm perfectly willing to grant that induction works. To put it another way, I'm not disputing that our inductive biases are the right ones. What I'm asking is how we ended up with the right inductive biases.

So let's take it for granted in this argument that our inductive biases match the world. It is true that all emeralds are (and will be) green. It is false that all emeralds are grue.

Hope this makes things less murky.

  
Reed



Posts: 274
Joined: Feb. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,19:33   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,13:02)

2) Our inductive biases are not particularly successful, and in so far as they are, it's just a lucky accident. Think of all the other species that went extinct due to bad inductive biases (the dodo, for instance). I don't find this satisfactory either. While evolution has no doubt sampled a large number of different sorts of inductive biases, and many have proved unsuccessful, it is also true that the number of biases sampled is an infinitesimally small proportion of the total number of possible biases. And yet it managed to hit on ones that have allowed a number of species to survive for millions of years after the respective biases evolved. This seems too improbable to be explicable as a lucky accident. So we should expect that the sampling wasn't random. There was some kind of search mechanism that looked for biases that more or less match the natural structure of the world. What I have been arguing is that this search mechanism could not have been natural selection, because when you lack information beyond a certain point in time, it radically underdetermines your judgments about which predicates are natural.

This seems to boil down to an argument from personal incredulity. You find it unsatisfying or extremely unlikely, but can you back that dissatisfaction up with a specific, real world example of where evolution is insufficient ? The grue/bleen example definitely fails the real world criteria, at multiple levels.

We appear to live in a universe that is consistent enough for induction to be useful. If you accept that, then evolution producing creatures which successfully use induction should be completely unsurprising. Successfully approximating the future can help you reproduce, and biochemical processes can produce such approximations. If the inductive biases of our early hominid ancestors gave them an advantage, it was because those biases in some way reflected the real world. In a relatively consistent universe, it follows that their successful descendants would tend to inherent biases that reflected the real world they lived in.

Your argument that evolution needs to predict certain things (picking the "right" biases millions of years in advance) looks like it can be rephrased as a statement that the pace of change of our environment has been sufficiently low to avoid complete extinction. Looking at the actual characteristics of our planet and biology, this does not seem especially remarkable. If you are going to claim that it is beyond the reach of observed mechanism, you'd better come up with some specific data.

  
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,19:43   

Quote
No, I'm saying the scientific method was developed to minimize the role of bias, such as through the use of multiple observers and other objective measures.


Oh, no doubt the scientific method is set up to minimize (and ideally, perhaps, eliminate) all sorts of biases. And perhaps to some degree scientists try to remove certain types of inductive bias. But inductive bias is unlike many other types of systematic bias in that eliminating it altogether is undesirable. After all, without an inductive bias, learning is impossible.

In fact, specific inductive biases are integral elements of the scientific method. Occam's razor and it's technical statistical counterparts, for instance. Without these tools for deciding which hypotheses are simple, every dataset would be compatible with an infinity of hypotheses with no means of deciding between them. Thank god for inductive bias.

But of course, the fact that we couldn't do science without an inductive bias means the sort of foundational issues raised by the problem of induction are ineliminable. So I question your claim that the problem of induction is more of a problem for naive induction than for the scientific method. It is, in fact, a problem for any learning algorithm.

Still, I am with you that the epistemological issues aren't important here and should be set aside.

  
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,20:00   

Quote

If the inductive biases of our early hominid ancestors gave them an advantage, it was because those biases in some way reflected the real world. In a relatively consistent universe, it follows that their successful descendants would tend to inherent biases that reflected the real world they lived in.


But what does it mean to say that their biases "reflected the real world." What it is for an inductive bias to reflect the real world is for the bias to allow predictions that match the real world. So the way to check whether a bias reflects the real world or not is to let the organism make a prediction and then wait to see whether the prediction comes true or not. Then maybe eliminate all the organisms whose predictions were false and repeat the process again with the remaining ones, and so on.

Now this explicitly did not happen with homonids. A very small number of possible biases were sampled. One of them was basically selected over the others something like 5 million years ago, and there has been no further selection along this parameter since then. But the one that was selected has worked throughout those 5 million years.

Now I agree with you that this would work if we assumed that the pace of change in the environment would be slow, and maybe evolution had some reason for making that assumption (apologies again for the anthropomorphization). But actually we need to know more than that. A change that is gradual or non-existent under a blue-green representation is radical and discontinuous under a grue-bleen basis. So we need to assume not just that the pace of change is slow, but that the pace of change under this representation rather than that one is slow. And this just returns us to the problem of selecting the appropriate inductive bias.

  
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,20:20   

Reed,

Picture yourself in the role of evolution. You are presented with a particular phenotype, you look at it, look at the environment in which it lives and decide how fit it's going to be. Its 5 million BC and you're presented with six different types of hominids: blue-green, 1612 grue-bleen, 1712 grue-bleen, 1812 grue-bleen, 1912 grue-bleen and 2012 grue-bleen. Now you look at their environment and assign fitness values to them. You think, "Ah, blue-green should be pretty fit because its picking up on a stable set of properties." Then you look at 1612 grue-bleen and you go, "Oh crap, this looks like a stable set of properties too. At least, given the information I have right now. I'd have to wait till 1612 to figure out which one of them is right. So I guess given what I know now, I should assign this guy the same fitness as blue-green." And exactly similarly for all the others. Of course, successfully approximating the future helps you reproduce, and effects your fitness, but all of these different inductive agents are equally good at successfully approximating the future in their immediate environment. You have no basis for considering one fitter than the other right now.

Come 1612, of course, you say "Ah, now I know 1612 grue-bleen isn't a stable set of properties, so I can reduce the fitness of this guy." But you can only say that in 1612.

But of course, this didn't actually happen. What actually happened is that evolution chose blue-green 5 mya and stuck with it. But if the story I've told above is on the right track, then there is something arbitrary about this choice. It could just as well have chosen 1612 grue-bleen or 1712 grue-bleen or... (if these variations had been available, of course, which they weren't, but that's beside the point). And if it had chosen any of those other traits, that particular lineage of homonids would have been screwed by now. But no, evolution fortuitously bet on the phenotype that has remained unscrewed for all these years.

  
Reciprocating Bill



Posts: 4265
Joined: Oct. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,20:49   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,21:20)
Reed,

Picture yourself in the role of evolution. You are presented with a particular phenotype, you look at it, look at the environment in which it lives and decide how fit it's going to be. Its 5 million BC and you're presented with six different types of hominids: blue-green, 1612 grue-bleen, 1712 grue-bleen, 1812 grue-bleen, 1912 grue-bleen and 2012 grue-bleen. Now you look at their environment and assign fitness values to them. You think, "Ah, blue-green should be pretty fit because its picking up on a stable set of properties." Then you look at 1612 grue-bleen and you go, "Oh crap, this looks like a stable set of properties too. At least, given the information I have right now. I'd have to wait till 1612 to figure out which one of them is right. So I guess given what I know now, I should assign this guy the same fitness as blue-green." And exactly similarly for all the others. Of course, successfully approximating the future helps you reproduce, and effects your fitness, but all of these different inductive agents are equally good at successfully approximating the future in their immediate environment. You have no basis for considering one fitter than the other right now.

Come 1612, of course, you say "Ah, now I know 1612 grue-bleen isn't a stable set of properties, so I can reduce the fitness of this guy." But you can only say that in 1612.

But of course, this didn't actually happen. What actually happened is that evolution chose blue-green 5 mya and stuck with it. But if the story I've told above is on the right track...

The story you have told isn't on the right track. Your parable, once again, portrays selection as forward looking and in some sense representational, when it is in fact backward looking and does not represent at all. Absent those properties, your problem evaporates.

--------------
Myth: Something that never was true, and always will be.

"The truth will set you free. But not until it is finished with you."
- David Foster Wallace

"Here’s a clue. Snarky banalities are not a substitute for saying something intelligent. Write that down."
- Barry Arrington

  
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,21:02   

How does my parable represent selection as forward-looking? I was trying to deliberately avoid that. In fact my whole point is that the success of our inductive bias cannot be explained adaptively because selection is not forward-looking.

  
Reed



Posts: 274
Joined: Feb. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,22:29   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,18:20)
Picture yourself in the role of evolution. You are presented with a particular phenotype, you look at it, look at the environment in which it lives and decide how fit it's going to be.

This is a terrible way of thinking about it. Evolution doesn't think, doesn't plan, doesn't care how many species go extinct. It's not striving toward some specific goal. It just tinkers and kills. Your burden, if you are going to claim that this is insufficient, is to come up with a specific case where it is demonstrably insufficient. Not a contrived example with no connection to the real world.

To belabor the point:
 
Quote
Now I agree with you that this would work if we assumed that the pace of change in the environment would be slow, and maybe evolution had some reason for making that assumption (apologies again for the anthropomorphization).

Don't apologize, just don't do it. Evolution doesn't make assumptions. We observe that the pace of change is slow enough that life has been able to adapt to it so far. Based on this observation, evolution appears to be a sufficient explanation. If you want to claim this is not so, come up with some specifics.

The whole grue/bleen analogy doesn't cut it. I thought you already acknowledged this, but it appears not.

1) Vision (like most traits of living creatures) is sloppy. A good fraction of humans are dichromats, a few are monochromats, and some may even be tetrachromats. Trichromats appear to be favored, but one can easily imagine a slightly different history where we ended up dichromat, like many other successful species. Evolution didn't pick some single right answer in advance, it just rolled the dice and we adapted to the result. If the dice landed differently, we would have adapted differently, or gone extinct.

2) The hypothetical case of the world suddenly strongly favoring grue/bleen is fantasy. Evolution doesn't account for it, which is fine, because it hasn't happened.

3) If it did happen, the sloppiness in 1) suggests that it wouldn't necessarily be fatal. If were fatal... so what ? The vast majority of species that have existed are extinct, precisely because they faced contingencies that evolution didn't "plan" for. The same could happen to us at any moment. We are, in essence, the descendants of a long line of lottery winners. That sounds unlikely (or maybe a sign of outside interference, as the ID camp would like to claim), until you realize that everyone with a losing ticket has been shot, and the winners have had enough children to replace them.

edot for tipoes!

  
Reciprocating Bill



Posts: 4265
Joined: Oct. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,22:45   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,22:02)
In fact my whole point is that the success of our inductive bias cannot be explained adaptively because selection is not forward-looking.

Perhaps it is more accurate to say that something misleading lurks in a characterization of the problem "solved" by evolution as "success of our inductive bias." This appears to be a problem for selection, which is not forward looking, because "success of inductive bias" appears to require a look-ahead of which selection is not capable.

But the success of an inductive bias, as is the case with all adaptations, inheres in its previous effectiveness in furthering survival and reproduction, not as an arrangement "for" future successes. They behave "as if" they anticipate future environments, but that is a mischaracterization. (One can argue that it is an easy mischaracterization to make, given that one of our inductive biases may be to see purpose and agency in complex functioning. Hence it reflects a failure of one of our inductive biases.) They're adaptive until they aren't. Hominid vision will be adaptive until it isn't. As I observed earlier, 99.99% of species are extinct because their adaptive bets were rendered obsolete by environmental changes. The primate run has not been particularly long, and does not require special explanation.

BTW, I don't see that perceptual inductive biases are different in kind than other adaptations. How did embryological bird wings come to anticipate the aerodynamic demands of the current atmosphere? How is it that avian flight evolved tens of millions of years ago in such a way that it anticipated the demands of current atmospheric systems? The answer is that neither did either. I don't see that the evolution of inductive biases, and their success over long periods of time, present a challenge differing in kind from these adaptations.

--------------
Myth: Something that never was true, and always will be.

"The truth will set you free. But not until it is finished with you."
- David Foster Wallace

"Here’s a clue. Snarky banalities are not a substitute for saying something intelligent. Write that down."
- Barry Arrington

  
Nerull



Posts: 317
Joined: June 2007

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,23:00   

Given the way color vision works, blue-green would almost be required to evolve before grue-breen. The eye works by filtering light through different colored pigments, much in the same way digital cameras work - consumer grade cameras have built in filters, like our eyes, scientific grade cameras usually place filters in front of the entire sensor, but still work in a similar manner.

Too add in a timer that swaps around colors at a certain date requires adding on to the existing color vision mechanism. This means that, in order to spread through the population, there needs to be some reason why grue-breen is selected over blue-green. The more complicated something is, the easier it is to break, so this seems unlikely.

--------------
To rebut creationism you pretty much have to be a biologist, chemist, geologist, philosopher, lawyer and historian all rolled into one. While to advocate creationism, you just have to be an idiot. -- tommorris

   
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 20 2008,23:56   

Quote
This is a terrible way of thinking about it. Evolution doesn't think, doesn't plan, doesn't care how many species go extinct. It's not striving toward some specific goal. It just tinkers and kills. Your burden, if you are going to claim that this is insufficient, is to come up with a specific case where it is demonstrably insufficient. Not a contrived example with no connection to the real world.


OK, I'll admit that I should try to avoid using language that suggests natural selection is an intentional agent. But the point I was trying to make didn't rely on those ill-advised rhetorical flourishes. I really don't understand what you mean when you ask for a specific case where evolution is demonstrably insufficient. I think there is only a specific case where this is true - inductive bias. As far as I'm aware, natural selection is perfectly capable of explaining all other functional traits.

The example I used may be a bit simplified, but is a real world example. The fact that you think otherwise suggests to me that there is something about the example you do not understand. So let me try one more time:

1. Humans have certain inductive biases (in the real world, not some contrived hypothetical world). A particular example is the tendency to think of the color properties of many sorts of surfaces observed under normal circumstances as projectible. My jacket is blue and I confidently project that my jacket will be blue tomorrow. I also confidently project that the next emerald to be found will be green.

2. These biases, considered collectively, are highly functional. They support inferences which allow us to plan and learn about the world successfully.

3. These traits were selected a long long time ago and have remained more or less fixed in humans for at least, say, the past 100,000 years. There have not been significant selective forces altering our most basic inductive biases for at least that long.

4. So biases that were selected for their immediate projectibility over 100,000 years ago remain projectible today. This is by no means unsurprising. There are a vast number of other potential inductive biases that would have been just as fit as the current one 100,000 years ago, but would not continue to track the structure of the world for the ensuing 100,000 years. Somehow, humans ended up with a set of biases that are quite extraordinarily functional.

5. Here are some hypotheses about why we ended up with biases that work today:
(a) Natural Selection. This can't be the answer. By 3, there has not been significant selection for these traits (because there has not been significant variation) in at least the past 100,000 years. So if there was selection for the biases, it happened more than 100,000 years ago. But, like I said, there are a vast number of possible biases that would have been just as fit 100,000 years ago as our actual biases, but would not have been as successful over the next 100,000 years. Natural selection cannot account for why we ended up with our particular bias rather than one of these less functional biases.
But perhaps you disagree that these alternate biases would have been as fit 100,000 years ago. Even though they were as predictively successful as the blue-green bias in that environment, perhaps the argument is that they were not as simple as the blue-green bias, and so imposed extra resource costs on organisms that adhered to them. This is the sort of argument keith was making earlier. See my responses to him and to Wesley on the previous page about how such judgments of simplicity already presume a certain inductive bias. There is, as far as I know, no bias-independent conception of simplicity on which blue-green is the simplest bias. In fact, there is no bias-independent conception of simplicity at all.
Finally, one could respond (as you did) that natural selection selected for the inductive biases that reflect the structure of the world. But selection could only have used information about the environment at that particular time, viz. 100,000 years ago (plus information about past environments stored in the organism's genome). And, like I said, there were a vast number of different biases which reflected the structure of the world at that time but would not have continued to reflect that structure as time went on. None of these biases were selected. The one that was selected is the one that continued to work reliably for the next 100,000 years.
(b) Morphological/Developmental Constraints. Perhaps biochemistry sets constraints on the sorts of inductive agents that can develop, and that explains why we ended up with this particular set of inductive biases rather than some other set. This might well be true, but it does not answer the question. The question is "Why do our inductive biases work so well today?" The answer can't be "Because they are one of the few sets of morphologically feasible biases." That doesn't address the question at all.
© Trivial. This is the response that basically rejects that the question is problematic at all. It's along the lines of "The world is blue and green, damnit, not grue and bleen like in your fantasy scenario. The organisms that evolve will be the ones who see things in blue and green." I hope it's clear now why this sort of response doesn't get to the issue I'm concerned with. I'm not questioning the fact that blue and green are natural predicates. I'm not postulating (as you suggest) some bizarre hypothetical world in which colors change. I'm saying, granted that blue and green are natural projectible predicates, what explains the evolution of organisms (like us) that know this, that have by and large the right sorts of inductive biases. It's a question about the evolution of an actual observable trait in the actual world, accompanied by an argument as to why this question is particularly problematic.

  
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,00:00   

Nerull,

Quote
Given the way color vision works, blue-green would almost be required to evolve before grue-breen. The eye works by filtering light through different colored pigments, much in the same way digital cameras work - consumer grade cameras have built in filters, like our eyes, scientific grade cameras usually place filters in front of the entire sensor, but still work in a similar manner.

Too add in a timer that swaps around colors at a certain date requires adding on to the existing color vision mechanism. This means that, in order to spread through the population, there needs to be some reason why grue-breen is selected over blue-green. The more complicated something is, the easier it is to break, so this seems unlikely.


I think this is basically the same sort of worry keith had. I wrote a response to him here. Look it over and see if it works.

  
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,00:21   

Quote

BTW, I don't see that perceptual inductive biases are different in kind than other adaptations. How did embryological bird wings come to anticipate the aerodynamic demands of the current atmosphere? How is it that avian flight evolved tens of millions of years ago in such a way that it anticipated the demands of current atmospheric systems? The answer is that neither did either. I don't see that the evolution of inductive biases, and their success over long periods of time, present a challenge differing in kind from these adaptations.


Hmmm... I see what you are saying. This is sort of like the No Free Lunch stuff. (Hey, maybe I am Dembski!) For natural selection to be a successful search strategy, we already assume that the fitness landscape has certain features, specifically the sort of features that enable NS's own inductive bias to work fairly well (and one of the requisites is probably some sort of cross-temporal smoothness). The case of the evolution of our own inductive bias is really no different. Yes, we have to appeal to evolution's bias to justify our own bias, but that's true for every single adaptation.

That's really helpful. Thanks Bill. I guess I was making a pretty simple mistake. When you put it that way, the explanatory itch kind of goes away. I see nothing problematic about assuming a certain structure to the fitness landscape when discussing other traits, so why this one?

Anyway, I'll have to think about it some more, but for the moment I'm satisfied. Apologies for any aggravation, people.

  
keiths



Posts: 2195
Joined: Jan. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,07:30   

Quote

Borges' Animals

In "The Analytical Language of John Wilkins," Borges describes 'a certain Chinese Encyclopedia,' the Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge, in which it is written that animals are divided into:

those that belong to the Emperor,
embalmed ones,
those that are trained,
suckling pigs,
mermaids,
fabulous ones,
stray dogs,
those included in the present classification,
those that tremble as if they were mad,
innumerable ones,
those drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,
others,
those that have just broken a flower vase,
those that from a long way off look like flies.

Now that we're done with grue/bleen, shall we talk about why nobody (besides certain mutant Chinese encyclopedists) classifies animals this way?  How did natural selection rule out this perfectly sensible scheme?   :p

--------------
And the set of natural numbers is also the set that starts at 0 and goes to the largest number. -- Joe G

Please stop putting words into my mouth that don't belong there and thoughts into my mind that don't belong there. -- KF

  
Zachriel



Posts: 2723
Joined: Sep. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,08:40   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,19:28)
I'm perfectly willing to grant that induction works.

Good. Let's see if we can keep to that. Simple induction is sufficient to determine that the universe is not random, but exhibits various types of order.

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,19:43)
But of course, the fact that we couldn't do science without an inductive bias means the sort of foundational issues raised by the problem of induction are ineliminable.

I didn't say they could be eliminated, ...

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,19:43)
So I question your claim that the problem of induction is more of a problem for naive induction than for the scientific method. It is, in fact, a problem for any learning algorithm.

I said they could be minimized. It's a practical difference, like a lever. Simple induction means we are confident that the Sun will still be there if we blink. Science allows us to be confident that the Earth moves.

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,20:00)
 
Quote

If the inductive biases of our early hominid ancestors gave them an advantage, it was because those biases in some way reflected the real world. In a relatively consistent universe, it follows that their successful descendants would tend to inherent biases that reflected the real world they lived in.


But what does it mean to say that their biases "reflected the real world." What it is for an inductive bias to reflect the real world is for the bias to allow predictions that match the real world. So the way to check whether a bias reflects the real world or not is to let the organism make a prediction and then wait to see whether the prediction comes true or not.

You just said you accepted induction, and therefore we can agree that there are aspects of order in the world. Now, it's a question of the details ...

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You never step on the same tard twice—for it's not the same tard and you're not the same person.

   
Zachriel



Posts: 2723
Joined: Sep. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,08:55   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,20:20)
Picture yourself in the role of evolution. You are presented with a particular phenotype, you look at it, look at the environment in which it lives and decide how fit it's going to be. Its 5 million BC and you're presented with six different types of hominids: blue-green, 1612 grue-bleen, 1712 grue-bleen, 1812 grue-bleen, 1912 grue-bleen and 2012 grue-bleen. Now you look at their environment and assign fitness values to them.

Grue-bleen takes some sort of complex timer. It wouldn't evolve in the first place. But let's accept that for argument's sake.

Blue-green is most fit. It simpler, lighter, and less likely to break and cause embarrassing, premature grue. Also, without the constraint of natural selection, grue-bleen systems will tend to be slowly degraded and lost. It's excess baggage.

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 20 2008,20:20)
What actually happened is that evolution chose blue-green 5 mya and stuck with it. But if the story I've told above is on the right track, then there is something arbitrary about this choice.

Of course. Why would you expect otherwise? Even if you *knew* that the world would turn grue-bleen, you wouldn't expect organisms to be adapted for that. Indeed, that would contradict the Theory of Evolution. I mentioned that before.

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 21 2008,00:21)
For natural selection to be a successful search strategy, we already assume that the fitness landscape has certain features, specifically the sort of features that enable NS's own inductive bias to work fairly well (and one of the requisites is probably some sort of cross-temporal smoothness).

Actually, we *observe* that the world appears to exhibit consistency. It happens to be such a world conducive to evolutionary processes.

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 21 2008,00:21)
Anyway, I'll have to think about it some more, but for the moment I'm satisfied.

Oops. I should have read ahead. Anyway, thanks for the discussion.

--------------

You never step on the same tard twice—for it's not the same tard and you're not the same person.

   
Zachriel



Posts: 2723
Joined: Sep. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,09:06   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 21 2008,00:21)
The case of the evolution of our own inductive bias is really no different. Yes, we have to appeal to evolution's bias to justify our own bias, but that's true for every single adaptation.

That's actually an interesting point. Humans certainly have biases. Evolution doesn't work to provide the best possible adaptation, but adaptations that are just good enough (or at least somewhat better than the other guy). And adaptations in one environment might be maladaptive in another, so life muddles along.

So there certainly are biases in humans. One important bias is anthropomorphisizing, that is, attributing human-like characteristics to non-human objects. Another is allowing subjectivity to lead to egoism. After all, an astronomer can make many careful measurements and determine that the universe revolves around him. Still another is allowing abstractions to confuse rather than enlighten, such as by conflating a categorization with the thing itself.

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You never step on the same tard twice—for it's not the same tard and you're not the same person.

   
RupertG



Posts: 80
Joined: Nov. 2005

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,10:29   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 21 2008,00:21)
Quote

BTW, I don't see that perceptual inductive biases are different in kind than other adaptations. How did embryological bird wings come to anticipate the aerodynamic demands of the current atmosphere? How is it that avian flight evolved tens of millions of years ago in such a way that it anticipated the demands of current atmospheric systems? The answer is that neither did either. I don't see that the evolution of inductive biases, and their success over long periods of time, present a challenge differing in kind from these adaptations.


Hmmm... I see what you are saying. This is sort of like the No Free Lunch stuff. (Hey, maybe I am Dembski!) For natural selection to be a successful search strategy, we already assume that the fitness landscape has certain features, specifically the sort of features that enable NS's own inductive bias to work fairly well (and one of the requisites is probably some sort of cross-temporal smoothness). The case of the evolution of our own inductive bias is really no different. Yes, we have to appeal to evolution's bias to justify our own bias, but that's true for every single adaptation.

That's really helpful. Thanks Bill. I guess I was making a pretty simple mistake. When you put it that way, the explanatory itch kind of goes away. I see nothing problematic about assuming a certain structure to the fitness landscape when discussing other traits, so why this one?

Anyway, I'll have to think about it some more, but for the moment I'm satisfied. Apologies for any aggravation, people.

You can think up plenty of explanations for most sorts of human behaviour, belief systems, prejudices and cognitive quirks if you approach the problem of how the species would best survive in our best-guess prehistoric scenarios, given our physical characteristics.

Which is far from saying that evolutionary psychology is always or even mostly right, in its current state. It itself is particularly prone to the sort of inductive biasses that Hom. sap. exhibits when gazing at its own navel. But it is a rich and thought-provoking field, with a great deal of potential, and there is indeed no reason to think that the particulars of our personal and social psychologies are exempt from evolutionary pressures. Rather radically otherwise, in fact, when you consider we've still got thousands of nukes pointing at our own heads.

R

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Uncle Joe and Aunty Mabel
Fainted at the breakfast table
Children, let this be a warning
Never do it in the morning -- Ralph Vaughan Williams

  
Wesley R. Elsberry



Posts: 4991
Joined: May 2002

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,21:53   

I specified a particular work that expands upon the ideas of Solomonoff and addresses inductive inference.

MSOB:

 
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They don't provide a language-independent notion of simplicity.


Wrong.

 
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Furthermore, an important result called the Invariance Theorem states, roughly speaking, that the Kolmogorov complexity of a string x relative to one programming language P1 is equal to the complexity relative to another language P2 , up to a ?xed additive constant that depends only on P1 and P2.


Trimming at the point where your reliance on a false premise invalidates further argument does shorten things up by quite a bit.

Yeah, option (1) is the correct one, and, no, your personal dissatisfaction doesn't disturb me.

MSOB:

 
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This seems too improbable to be explicable as a lucky accident.


Good thing evolutionary science includes processes that aren't simply random chance, then. The universal distribution explains why, a priori, the shortest explanations are also the most likely explanations. No preternatural aids to search required.

I've seen an apparent dearth of consistency in your argumentation. There was the obviously false bit about there never having been any radical contradiction of human inductive biases followed by the assertion that you hadn't actually meant that claim. You say that you don't find consideration of extinct species a good argument, but it certainly puts paid to your claim:

 
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But our folk inductive assumptions about medium-sized dry goods (stuff like shape, sensory properties, causal properties, etc.) works well enough to allow us (and all kinds of other animals) to get by pretty well.


In my estimation, you have been long on assertion and short on argument. You dismiss arguments without legitimate justification. Life is short. We may simply need to agree to disagree.

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"You can't teach an old dogma new tricks." - Dorothy Parker

    
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,22:53   

Wesley,

1. I am aware of the invariance theorem. You will note that on page 1 I made a post specifically mentioning that if we have two infinite strings, there may well be a language-independent sense in which one is simpler than the other. However, I think it's true that for any two finite strings there is no language-independent way to make qualitative comparisons of algorithmic complexity between them. And that is perfectly consistent with the invariance theorem. Is that wrong?

Perhaps I should not have written the sloppy sentence you quote, suggesting that there is no language-independent sense of simplicity simpliciter, but I do think if you had read my other contributions to the discussion you would have recognized that I wasn't making the specific mistake you charge.

I will look at that universal distribution paper you mention.

2. Also, I don't think my argument was inconsistent (at least, not in that regard). I agreed that our inductive biases are not optimal, but I maintained that it is surprising enough that they are as functional as they are. The fact that you think they have been selected suggests that you agree that they are functional enough to require some sort of explanation

I didn't just dismiss the point about extinction. I mentioned (in a number of posts) that a superexponentially vast number of possible inductive biases were never even sampled. Sure, a large number of species have gone extinct due to bad inductive biases. But that number is still miniscule in comparison to the number of possible biases. In the absence of a plausible search strategy like NS (at least that's what I thought at the time, but see below) I suggested it was very unlikely to hit upon functional biases in so few tries (relatively speaking).

3. We don't have to agree to disagree. At least, not about the larger point of whether or not our inductive biases could be selected. I have already conceded that my question was misguided. This discussion has cleared up the issue for me and I no longer have a problem with evolutionary explanations of our biases. I suspect you haven't been reading all my posts. I don't blame you, considering how garrulous I am. But still, I would hope you would have read everything I wrote before saying, for instance, that I am long on assertion but short on argument.

  
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 21 2008,22:59   

Quote
However, I think it's true that for any two finite strings there is no language-independent way to make qualitative comparisons of algorithmic complexity between them. And that is perfectly consistent with the invariance theorem. Is that wrong?


I should qualify this. I haven't yet read the universal distribution paper, and maybe it's the case that it shows that my claim is false. If that's the case I'd be very surprised, though. Don't think I'll get the chance to read it tonight, but I'll definitely look at it tomorrow.

However, I do think that my claim is consistent with the invariance theorem.

  
Wesley R. Elsberry



Posts: 4991
Joined: May 2002

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,00:13   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 21 2008,22:59)
     
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However, I think it's true that for any two finite strings there is no language-independent way to make qualitative comparisons of algorithmic complexity between them. And that is perfectly consistent with the invariance theorem. Is that wrong?


I should qualify this. I haven't yet read the universal distribution paper, and maybe it's the case that it shows that my claim is false. If that's the case I'd be very surprised, though. Don't think I'll get the chance to read it tonight, but I'll definitely look at it tomorrow.

However, I do think that my claim is consistent with the invariance theorem.


Let's see.

   
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But of course, the algorithmic complexity of a particular problem depends crucially on the structure of the computer. One could construct computers for which the string 1010101010101010.... is simple and predictable. In fact, we ourselves are such computers. But we could also construct weird computers for which this string is quite complex, and the string 110001001000110101011.... is simple. It all depends on what the "natural language" is for the computer, and that depends on how the computer is constructed. Similarly for blue-green and grue-bleen. We happen to be blue-green computers. For us, these are natural and projectible predicates. The world will be simple if blue things stay blue; it will be less simple if blue things change to green at some arbitrary time. But grue-bleen computers, for which the exact opposite is true, are not inconceivable. So a syntactic notion of simplicity doesn't settle the matter.


   
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In describing the two binary strings, I shouldn't have put ellipses at the end suggesting they're infinitely long. If they were, then it might well be the case that there is no UTM for which the second string is algorithmically simpler than the first one. Imagine the ellipses merely indicate that the strings are a billion digits long.


The Invariance Theorem, and all of algorithmic information theory, is about quantitative, not qualitative differences. And if we take the last sentence quoted as an indication that you are positing the comparison of two bit strings of the same length, why, yes, the Universal Distribution does permit you to compare them quantitatively. The Invariance Theorem says that they each can be generated by a UTM program with at most an additive constant's difference from an implementation in a different language, and any such constant is likely to be small relative to the program size for any non-trivial length program (and a billion bits certainly qualifies). The lengths of the shortest UTM programs generating each string (or computable approximation thereof) can be used via the Universal Distribution and does yield a language-independent, quantitative, a priori comparison of complexity.

In short: yes, it is wrong to say that no quantitative comparison is possible between two finite bit strings. The Invariance Theorem alone may not show that, but certainly the whole of algorithmic information theory is capable of showing that to be wrong.

   
Quote

Perhaps I should not have written the sloppy sentence you quote, suggesting that there is no language-independent sense of simplicity simpliciter, but I do think if you had read my other contributions to the discussion you would have recognized that I wasn't making the specific mistake you charge.


The problem with arguing with someone who is inconsistent is that they may state incorrect things at one time, and correct things at another. The quotes above are sufficient to show that you did make the mistake I indicated; that is, the mistake does exist in stuff that you have written here. I've pretty much limited myself to our exchanges rather than the whole of the thread, so if you managed to get it right elsewhere, that would be good, but it doesn't get you a pass when you do demonstrably get it wrong.

 
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But of course, the algorithmic complexity of a particular problem depends crucially on the structure of the computer.


The argument that different computers can reduce the size of input data needed to emit a bit string doesn't comport with familiarity with algorithmic information theory, where the computational complexity is defined as the minimal size of input and program that emits a particular string. In the case of the two example strings, a computer program that privileges the second string will be longer than the minimal computer program to emit the first string. That dog won't hunt, in other words. Shifting the complexity from the input to the program (or "computer structure") doesn't -- and can't -- make the complexity go away.

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"You can't teach an old dogma new tricks." - Dorothy Parker

    
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,02:02   

Wesley,

Thanks for pointing me to the universal distribution. It sounds very interesting and I will certainly look into it. I don't want to pretend to have more than a layperson's familiarity with algorithmic information theory. I was aware of the invariance theorem, but I had not heard of the universal distribution before.

I still don't think I've been inconsistent, at least not in a dishonest way. I am probably guilty of qualifying statements I've made in one post in some other post, and also of being sloppy on occasion. I was trying to rapidly respond to a number of different people, and unfortunately rigor was a casualty.

I hesitate to carry this discussion further because (a) I feel like my initial question has been adequately answered and (b) you would undoubtedly mop the floor with me if we argued about information theory. But I do take issue with your response to one of my points:

Quote
The argument that different computers can reduce the size of input data needed to emit a bit string doesn't comport with familiarity with algorithmic information theory, where the computational complexity is defined as the minimal size of input and program that emits a particular string. In the case of the two example strings, a computer program that privileges the second string will be longer than the minimal computer program to emit the first string. That dog won't hunt, in other words. Shifting the complexity from the input to the program (or "computer structure") doesn't -- and can't -- make the complexity go away.


By "computer" I didn't mean the program but the UTM on which the program is run. For any particular pair of finite strings A and B, I can construct a UTM for which the minimal program to output A will be shorter than the program to output B, and I can construct another UTM for which the B program will be shorter than the A program. This is what I was claiming and I still think it must be true. Now maybe one of these UTMs is far more unlikely than the other (assuming some sort of probability measure over the ensemble of all UTMs). But for any two finite strings one could in principle construct a UTM that favored either one of them. Is this wrong?

  
Missing Shade of Blue



Posts: 62
Joined: Dec. 2008

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,02:05   

Sloppy again. Instead of "Maybe one of these UTMs..." read "Maybe one of these types of UTMs..."

  
Zachriel



Posts: 2723
Joined: Sep. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,07:08   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 22 2008,02:02)
By "computer" I didn't mean the program but the UTM on which the program is run. For any particular pair of finite strings A and B, I can construct a UTM for which the minimal program to output A will be shorter than the program to output B, and I can construct another UTM for which the B program will be shorter than the A program. This is what I was claiming and I still think it must be true. Now maybe one of these UTMs is far more unlikely than the other (assuming some sort of probability measure over the ensemble of all UTMs).

It's true that no search algorithm is better than any other, on average, on an arbitrary landscape. But we're not talking about an arbitrarily chaotic universe.

One simple feature of the universe is the locality of patterns. So, if we look at a point in space and see water, then nearby points will be much more likely, on average, to be water. A similar aspect of this is the idea of surfaces, interiors, directions.  This is a universe that consists of what we call "objects".

Our search algorithm consists of replicators, objects that exist *within* this space full of other objects, all of which are bound by the laws of energy and matter. And this is the type of space that is amenable to evolutionary search.

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You never step on the same tard twice—for it's not the same tard and you're not the same person.

   
Zachriel



Posts: 2723
Joined: Sep. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,07:20   

Quote (Missing Shade of Blue @ Dec. 22 2008,02:02)
But for any two finite strings one could in principle construct a UTM that favored either one of them. Is this wrong?

Now, let's consider an organism that creates a model of the universe. We might give this model a name, "mind".

In the case of humans, there are all sorts of questionable assumptions built into the model. As I mentioned before, anthropomorphization, egoism and over-abstraction. Though the model may not be an exact simulacrum of the actual universe, because it is the result of the evolutionary process leading up to "mind" we expect it to be a reasonably close facsimile. It is not completely detached from the world because then it would no longer be adaptive. "Mind" is not *arbitrary*.

But even in cases where we might recognize an 'error', such as anthropomorphizing the weather, people mold these aspects of thought to the world. They 'map' one chaotic system to another. So the weather is angry, but anger never lasts forever. Because humans are a cultural organism, sometimes even strange thoughts can help the group (though obviously some thoughts can be considered maladaptive, such as when they do become completely detached from the world).

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You never step on the same tard twice—for it's not the same tard and you're not the same person.

   
Quack



Posts: 1961
Joined: May 2007

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,10:16   

OK, so he isn't Dembski. But do we know that he can't be "Mike Gene"? I see too little of what I'd expect to see as background?

Popping out of the blue, a full fledged blog/newsgroup junkie?

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Rocks have no biology.
              Robert Byers.

  
stevestory



Posts: 13407
Joined: Oct. 2005

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,10:35   

I don't know. But so far, MSOB's acting like he has a brain, which is more than you can say for Davetard, BarryA, Bradford, Salvador, Casey, etc.

   
k.e..



Posts: 5432
Joined: May 2007

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,11:17   

Quote (Quack @ Dec. 22 2008,18:16)
OK, so he isn't Dembski. But do we know that he can't be "Mike Gene"? I see too little of what I'd expect to see as background?

Popping out of the blue, a full fledged blog/newsgroup junkie?

Our amateur sleuth Hercule Poirot hot on the trail of Sacrébleu posts a notice on the wall asking if anyone has seen his ghost.

I'm sure while ..or whilst he is "looking into" .....yawn ...."whateva" as a sloppy layman his deduction will be more than the sum product of the infinite deposit nonlinear reductions equaling a binary number bigger than ...er really huge..thus quizzing or at least begging an answer to the age old cunundrum "Which is the longest path between two race courses?"

Given that the Hagurland equation has only ever been seen in a red dress thus proving blue is sky except at night then the whole problem of god being dissatisfied with Darwin takes on a whole new meaning n'est pa?

But you see Freud is dead and my mother is not, so can there really be any meaning to any of his statements regarding boys looking at their own reflections and falling in love with their mothers even though most of them have a hairy helper?

Never in the history of the world has so little been known by people 2000 plus years ago.

I suggest a call to Miss Marple and some afternoon tea with cake for Mr Poirot.

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"I get a strong breeze from my monitor every time k.e. puts on his clown DaveTard suit" dogdidit
"ID is deader than Lenny Flanks granmaws dildo batteries" Erasmus
"I'm busy studying scientist level science papers" Galloping Gary Gaulin

  
Louis



Posts: 6436
Joined: Jan. 2006

(Permalink) Posted: Dec. 22 2008,12:08   

Quote (stevestory @ Dec. 22 2008,16:35)
I don't know. But so far, MSOB's acting like he has a brain, which is more than you can say for Davetard, BarryA, Bradford, Salvador, Casey, etc.

Come on guys, give the blue lad/ladette a break. Thus far he/she's been everything we could ask for: intelligent and polite.

So he/she disagrees with/has some questions about evolutionary biology, hardly the end of the universe. It is at least possible he/she has arrived at this point honestly. I'm all for giving him/her the benefit of the doubt until such a time as he/she proves to be a turd, if indeed this happens.

I know I'm resident Ultra-Meanie and purveyor of poor quality tasteless jokes, but dudes and dudettes, it's Christmas....

{runs and hides}

Louis

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Bye.

  
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