Kantian Naturalist
Posts: 72
Joined: Mar. 2013
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Glen,
I mostly agree with you there. But notice that there's a difference between the descriptive claim -- the fact of cultural diversity pluralism about moral judgments and their basis -- and the prescriptive claim.
The absolutist wants to claim that some cultures have deeply skewed moral judgments, and are deeply mistaken about their basis, and that others are not (or less so). The relativist is skeptical that we have any epistemic access to any trans-cultural standards that could do the work that the absolutist requires. In other words, if there were trans-cultural standards, how could we ever know what they are?
This distinction is a bit different from the epistemological divide between rationalists and empiricists, though. Could one be an absolutist and an empiricist? John Stuart Mill tried to square that circle, and so have others before and since. (Not that any attempts have been particularly convincing, but . . . )
One of the big problems with the folks at Uncommon Descent is that they are caught up in the grips of what Mark Johnson calls "the Moral Law Folk Theory", which he characterizes as follows:
1. Humans have a split nature -- a mental or spiritual dimension and a physical or bodily dimension.
2. We are driven by our bodily needs and desires to seek satisfactions and pleasures. Because our needs and desires are not intrinsically rational, there is a fundamental moral tension between our higher (mental, spiritual) and lower (physical, bodily) selves.
3. The problem of morality only arises for beings with split natures like ourselves, who have a faculty of "free will" for overriding our bodily needs and desires.
4. Moral constraint comes from a set of universally binding principles supplied by revelation or reason.
5. Morally right conduct thus consists in discerning which universally binding principles apply to a specific situation and having the strength of will to act as the moral principle requires.
The split nature thesis is doing ALL of the work here. By "materialism," the UD crowd mean the denial of the mental/spiritual/rational dimension. All that's left is the bodily/physical side, which is driven only by selfish pleasures and desires. They insist that "materialism" cannot explain rationality, normativity, or morality because their understanding of rationality, normativity, and morality is itself governed by their commitment to the split nature thesis. Deny the split, they think, and there's no way to understand rationality, normativity, and morality.
What has gone missing, of course, is the possibility of denying the split while at the same time affirming rationality, normativity, and morality. There are versions of this account in Hegel, Marx, Dewey, and the Frankfurt School of critical theory. It's flourishing today in the work of philosophers like Mark Johnson, John McDowell, Owen Flanagan, and Philip Kitcher. The UD crowd doesn't know any of this, and they don't want to know it, because it shows that their conception of rationality, normativity, and morality isn't the only game in town.
In this regard they are actually helped by extremists like Alex Rosenberg, who DOES deny rationality, normativity, and morality. (It's actually not that hard to see what is wrong with Rosenberg's argument, but the UD crowd is so appalled by the conclusion that they never bother to examine the argument itself.)
The other night a friend of mine suggested that Rosenberg is nice to have around because he makes other naturalists like Kitcher and Dennett seem reasonable by comparison. But I think that Rosenberg ends up doing much more damage than he realizes. The UD crowd is not being unreasonable in saying, "if that's the logical culmination of naturalism, then screw it -- theism, here I come!"
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One could reject all notions of value on that basis, and of course no-one does. 
