Reciprocating Bill
Posts: 4265
Joined: Oct. 2006
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TP:
| Quote | | Excuse my desire to keep coming back to consciousness but, to me, an ability to represent isn't very significant. |
Well, then, I guess I am a little confused about the intent of the post to which I originally responded. There you said:
| Quote | What I was attempting to point out is the repercussions of concluding life and consciousness is required for any claim of purpose, period.
I suggest humans are inherently prejudiced to think of themselves as being something special.
“I think, therefore I am” has arrogant connotations.
It is a presumption of self existence with an implied sense of consciousness. This generally leads to a biased view of what is capable of intent and, therefore, purpose.
In many games (e.g. World of Warcraft) there are AI objects programmed with the “intent” of killing player characters. A similar example is a Windmill with the “intent” of pumping water. Do these things only qualify as having purpose because a special clump of matter imbued the non-living thing with this special characteristic?
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I took you to be saying that to insist that something like human consciousness and self-awareness are required for purposing reflects a humancentric perspective "that leads to a biased view of what is capable of intent and, therefore, purpose."
You cited the example of viruses, stating "it could be argued that viruses demonstrate intent and purpose even though most people presume they lack consciousness and may not qualify as life."
Therefore, you appeared to be saying that perhaps entities lacking something like human consciousness and "the presumption of self existence" (what is that?) may nevertheless be capable of intent, and therefore purpose.
In your subsequent post you seem to be saying (or asking) the opposite: that consciousness must be present for us to ascribe to an agent the capacity for purposing.
| Quote | Excuse my desire to keep coming back to consciousness but, to me, an ability to represent isn't very significant.
For example, many years ago I was in charge of a simulation project for the investigation of various torpedo verses target scenarios.
The software stored representations of multiple objects in memory and applied six-degree of freedom motions to them resulting in the creation of a physical, tangable product in the form of graphs and charts. Does that mean my software was doing "purposing"? |
I would say, of course, that your software did not engage in "purposing," even as it employs representations (although these have only "derived intentionality," borrowed from your own capacity to represent, in the same sense that windmill pumps have only "derived" purpose.) As you argue, "something more" is needed - something very like the human capacity for representation and perhaps consciousness.
So, are you arguing that to insist upon something like human consciousness is humancentric arrogance and bias, a bias that inappropriately causes us to withhold an ascription of purposing from other agents - from viruses and windmills, for example?
Or are you arguing that something like human consciousness IS requisite for purposing and intention?
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The fact of the matter is that having intentions, harboring purposes etc. are integral to our representation of human actions and agents, integral components of human theory of mind. These representations of agency have long an evolutionary and cultural histories and, in given individuals, dedicated neural structures that support this representational coin. These representations are also integral to human language and have been hugely culturally elaborated and nuanced. We are immersed in such representations and the surrounding cultural elaborations from from birth. When we refer to "purpose" and "intentions" (as well as to "accidents") THAT is the rich history of representations to which we refer.
The key question is: Can these extremely rich and embedded human ascriptions of "intention" and "purpose" be generalized from this originating context to other settings and agents, or to the natural world generally? To viruses?
Perhaps so. The notion of "work" had origins in our sense of human labor, effort, fatigue, later agumented by animal labor, but has since within physics been given a much more abstract formulation that leaves behind the connotations of human labor. Perhaps "intending" can be given such an abstract formulation as well.
But perhaps not - perhaps "intention" and "agency" are deeply and contingently textured, given how intimately they are woven into our ancient ascriptions of human agency to one another. I'm more inclined to that position.
(BTW, vis the chess position: My freeware chess software (Sigma Chess) chose to eschew taking the rook after pondering the position for a minute or so. It projects a draw-like indefinite shuffling of the white king. Has my MacBook attained consciousness?)
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Myth: Something that never was true, and always will be.
"The truth will set you free. But not until it is finished with you."
- David Foster Wallace
"Here’s a clue. Snarky banalities are not a substitute for saying something intelligent. Write that down."
- Barry Arrington
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LOL
